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COMMENTS 
PROSECUTORIAL TRAINING WHEELS: 
GINSBURG’S CONNICK V. THOMPSON 




On March 29, 2011, the Supreme Court released a 5–4 decision in 
Connick v. Thompson,1 reversing an evenly divided en banc decision of the 
Fifth Circuit.2  The Court held that a § 1983 suit could not be used to hold a 
prosecutor’s office liable for a single Brady violation by a member of its 
staff3 on the theory that the office provided inadequate training.4  This 
 
* J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2013; B.A., Hope College, 
2005.  The author thanks his wife Gretchen for her assistance and support during these last 
three years.  He also appreciates the support of the Journal’s editiorial team, particularly 
Adam Israelov, Michael Krantz, Owen McGovern, Jessica Notebaert, and Olesya Salnikova, 
for strengthening this Comment and the faculty of Northwestern Law, in particular Ronald J. 
Allen, for shaping his understanding of law. 
1 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011). 
2 Thompson v. Connick, 578 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).  The en banc Fifth 
Circuit split eight judges to eight judges, thus affirming the district court’s opinion allowing 
Thompson’s § 1983 suit.  Id. at 293.  The Fifth Circuit, in granting a rehearing en banc, 
Thompson v. Connick, 562 F.3d 711, 711 (5th Cir. 2009), vacated a prior three-judge panel 
decision affirming the district court judgment, Thompson v. Connick, 553 F.3d 836, 869 (5th 
Cir. 2008). 
3 The Brady doctrine has evolved from Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), as 
explained infra in notes 116–150 and their accompanying text.  The Brady doctrine provides 
that the Due Process Clauses, U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, generally require a prosecutor to 
hand over “evidence [that] is material either to guilt or to punishment,” Brady, 373 U.S. at 
87.  Appellate courts ask whether such evidence is “potentially exculpatory” before 
reversing verdicts or sentences. 
1276 TIMOTHY FRY [Vol. 102 
decision overturned a $14 million jury award to respondent John 
Thompson, a former death row inmate who had been exonerated weeks 
before his scheduled execution.5  Beyond merely clarifying the reach of a 
failure-to-train claim,6 the majority and the dissent revealed starkly 
different views on training America’s prosecutors.7 
In the criminal cases underlying Thompson’s § 1983 suit, the Orleans 
Parish District Attorney’s Office in Louisiana tried Thompson separately 
for armed robbery and murder and secured convictions at both trials.  In 
both trials, the prosecutor’s office failed to turn over to the defense material 
evidence that cast doubt on Thompson’s guilt—blood tests that indicated he 
had not committed the armed robbery and eyewitness testimony suggesting 
he was not the murderer.8  After failing to turn over the blood tests, the 
Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office prosecutors secured the armed 
robbery conviction.  This ensured Thompson would not take the stand in his 
own defense at the murder trial,9 where he was convicted and sentenced to 
death.  When a defense investigator discovered these undisclosed facts 
weeks before Thompson’s scheduled execution, the court promptly reversed 
both of Thompson’s convictions.10 
After Louisiana unsuccessfully reprosecuted Thompson for both 
crimes, Thompson commenced a § 1983 suit against the Orleans Parish 
District Attorney’s Office, prosecutors, and various officials.  The only 
claim that went to trial alleged a failure to train prosecutors on their Brady 
doctrine obligations.11  The jury awarded $14 million because the district 
attorney’s office was “deliberately indifferent to the need to train, monitor, 
 
4 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1356; see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (providing claim against 
state government for “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws”). 
5 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1356–57. 
6 See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989) (allowing for the possibility of 
failure-to-train claims for “deliberately indifferent” standards in preparing city employees). 
7 See infra notes 13–19 and accompanying text. 
8 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1356. 
9 Id.  To make this point clearer, had Thompson testified at his own murder trial, the 
prosecution would have been able to introduce Thompson’s past convictions.  Id. at 1373 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); State v. Thompson, 825 So. 2d 552, 556 (La. Ct. App. 2002) 
(observing that defense attorneys “advised Mr. Thompson at that time, that should he take 
the witness stand, that the fact that he has prior convictions, including the prior conviction 
for attempted armed robbery would come up before the jury, which it would not if he didn’t 
testify”).  Louisiana did not contradict Thompson’s claim that he would have testified at his 
murder trial had he not been convicted at the improperly conducted armed robbery trial.  
Thompson, 825 So. 2d at 556. 
10 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1356–57. 
11 Id. at 1357. 
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and supervise [its] prosecutors to comply with the constitutional 
requirements concerning production of evidence favorable to an accused.”12  
The Supreme Court, in reversing, claimed that the plaintiff had not met his 
burden because he could not show either an official policy or a pattern of 
violations that caused his harm.13  Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, 
read the facts to say that only a single prosecutor withheld the evidence and 
Thompson’s case was unique.14  The office had no notice of Brady 
violations to correct through training.15 
Justice Thomas went on to discuss how prosecutors’ offices are 
protected more broadly from § 1983 suits because they employ trained 
attorneys.  Individual prosecutors have received “professional training and 
[have] ethical obligations” to inform themselves of the Brady doctrine.16  
Specifically, the attorneys in the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office 
graduated from law school, passed the Louisiana bar exam, and possibly 
attended continuing legal education training; they alone were responsible 
for their actions.17 
In an impassioned dissent, Justice Ginsberg took direct aim at whether 
this “training” was adequate.  She noted that the lead prosecutor’s alma 
mater did not require criminal procedure, passing the Louisiana bar exam 
did not require knowledge of Brady, and the state did not require continuing 
legal education at the time.18  In her dissent, which she read from the bench, 
she reasoned: 
 
12 Thompson v. Connick, No. CIV.A. 03-2045, 2007 WL 1200826, at *1 (E.D. La. Apr. 
23, 2007). 
13 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1358. 
14 Id. at 1364.  This statement was made despite, as already mentioned, the failure to 
provide Thompson with favorable evidence in two separate prosecutions and, as will be 
discussed, the habit of the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office of violating the Brady 
doctrine, as evidenced by multiple Supreme Court cases. 
15 Id. at 1360. 
16 Id. at 1363 (“Prosecutors are not only equipped but are also ethically bound to know 
what Brady entails and to perform legal research when they are uncertain.”).  Commentators 
have heaped scorn on Justice Thomas’s opinion.  See, e.g., Susan A. Bandes, The Lone 
Miscreant, the Self-Training Prosecutor, and Other Fictions: A Comment on Connick v. 
Thompson, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 715, 727–33 (2011) (arguing that the idea of self-training 
and self-regulation is a myth); Dahlia Lithwick, Cruel but Not Unusual, SLATE (Apr. 1, 
2011, 7:43 PM),  http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/04/
cruel_but_not_unusual.html (arguing that Justice Thomas’s opinion and Justice Scalia’s 
concurrence misread the facts in Connick and showed how they were “pitiless and scornful” 
of an innocent man wrongfully prosecuted, and calling the opinion “one of the meanest . . . 
decisions ever”). 
17 Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1361–62. 
18 Id. at 1385 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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A District Attorney aware of his office’s high turnover rate, who recruits prosecutors 
fresh out of law school and promotes them rapidly through the ranks, bears 
responsibility for ensuring that on-the-job training takes place.  In short, the buck 
stops with him. . . .  The evidence in this case presents overwhelming support for the 
conclusion that the Orleans Parish Office slighted its responsibility to the profession 
and to the State’s system of justice by providing no on-the-job Brady training.  [The 
petitioner district attorney] was not “entitled to rely on prosecutors’ professional 
training,” for [he] himself should have been the principal insurer of that training.19 
This Comment corroborates Justice Ginsburg’s view of the necessity 
of prosecutor training by exploring the interplay between discretion, 
misconduct, and training.  Specifically, in Part II, this Comment discusses 
how prosecutorial discretion can lead to cases of misconduct, which 
complex procedural doctrines like the Brady doctrine have been unable to 
eliminate.  In Part III, this Comment reveals the weaknesses of current 
training regimes, which other proposals have not addressed.  Finally, in 
Part IV, the Comment turns to a series of modest proposals to incentivize 
increased Brady-doctrine training.  Without increased training, Justice 
Ginsburg’s dissent will continue to echo as an unheeded warning against 
prosecutors who fail to provide proper due process protections for the 
accused, even those who are innocent. 
II. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND ITS LIMITS 
A. THE RESPONSIBILITY AND DISCRETION OF A PROSECUTOR 
Prosecutors have enormous, wide-ranging discretion to choose what 
crimes to investigate, whether to entertain plea bargains, when to grant 
immunity to a potential witness, how to organize the state’s case, which 
charges to prosecute, and even in which jurisdiction to bring a case.20  
Prosecutors are powerful actors, controlling the criminal justice system with 
an outsized impact on the wider political system.21  Prosecutors’ day-to-day 
 
19 Id. at 1387 (emphases added) (citations omitted).   
20 Geoffrey S. Corn & Adam M. Gershowitz, Imputed Liability for Supervising 
Prosecutors: Applying the Military Doctrine of Command Responsibility to Reduce 
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 395, 398 (2009); Teah R. Lupton, 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 90 GEO. L.J. 1279, 1280 (2002). 
21 ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 5 
(2007) [hereinafter ARBITRARY JUSTICE]; see also, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Prosecution and 
Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 25 (1998) (arguing 
that because prosecutors are the most powerful officials in the criminal justice system, they 
have a responsibility to use their discretion to overcome racial disparities in prosecutions and 
conviction rates); Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 393, 
405, 448 (1992) (describing prosecutors’ growing power since the 1970s and arguing that 
while a prosecutor has always been “one of the most powerful officials in government,” he 
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decisions happen behind closed doors and are virtually unreviewable.22  
Prosecutors are answerable only to other prosecutors,23 who rarely 
prosecute such misconduct.24  Elected prosecutors, despite having a 
responsibility to their electorates,25 rarely face punishment at the ballot box 
because the public usually does not learn of the misconduct and even if it 
does, it may not care as long as convictions resulted.26 
Prosecutorial discretion—deciding what legal actions to take, if 
any27—is a “residual concept” that leaves prosecutors the opportunity to 
exercise subjective judgment within the gaps of statutory and judge-made 
law.28  Legal philosophers have typically not provided a more particular 
definition29 because “like the hole in a doughnut,” discretion exists in 
between restrictions and “is therefore a relative concept.”30  The theoretical 
base of discretion is the Anglo-American understanding of free will.31  
Since people choose whether to exercise their own power, they have 
discretion to make choices about their actions.32  Discretion is likely 
inevitable due to human limitations33 and resource limitations making 
 
has become a “pervasive and dominant force in criminal justice”). 
22 DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 5. 
23 Id. 
24 See infra Part III.B.2. 
25 STEVEN W. PERRY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 2, 11 (2006) (reporting that all but three states and 
the District of Columbia elect their chief prosecutors); Abby L. Dennis, Comment, Reining 
in the Minister of Justice: Prosecutorial Oversight and the Superseder Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 
131, 138 (2007) (arguing that despite responsibility to their electorate, prosecutors are most 
concerned with convictions because that is what they are ultimately judged on); cf. Sanford 
C. Gordon & Gregory A. Huber, Citizen Oversight and the Electoral Incentives of Criminal 
Prosecutors, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 334, 350 (2002) (using a computer model to suggest that the 
electorate’s focus on convictions is not misplaced). 
26 DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 5; see also Ken Armstrong & Maurice 
Possley, Trial & Error: The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1999, at 1 [hereinafter 
The Verdict] (cataloging former prosecutors who were promoted or elected after 
demonstrated misconduct). 
27 Charles Breitel, Controls in Law Enforcement, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 427, 427–28 (1960). 
28 James Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials, 1976 DUKE 
L.J. 651, 653. 
29 Id. 
30 Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Law a System of Rules?, in ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 25, 
45 (Robert S. Summers ed., 1968) (suggesting that the meaning of “discretion” will depend 
on the context of authority and legal standards). 
31 See Breitel, supra note 27, at 427–28. 
32 Id. 
33 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 120–32 (1961) (theorizing law as a union of 
primary and secondary rules, which needs to allow for discretion due to humanity’s inability 
to predict all future quandaries). 
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punishment of all crimes impossible.34  The Supreme Court has endorsed 
prosecutorial discretion on numerous occasions.35   
Resource limitations make some discretion inevitable, but the modern 
criminal justice system guarantees wide-ranging discretion.  There are 
likely over 4,000 federal crimes,36 and that number is growing.37  The state 
level mirrors the federal crime increase.38  While this means that 
prosecutors face increasing trial dockets,39 there are also numerous crimes 
 
34 Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor’s Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 532, 533–35 (1970) (arguing that discretion also allows a prosecutor to consider the 
victim’s opinions, avoid costly prosecutions, achieve other enforcement goals, and decide 
when correction can be best accomplished without prosecution). 
35 See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (“In our criminal justice 
system, the Government retains ‘broad discretion’ as to whom to prosecute.”); United States 
v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 n.11 (1982) (indicating that a prosecutor’s discretion in 
selecting charges against an accused includes threatening additional charges if a plea 
agreement is not accepted); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (“[T]he conscious 
exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional 
violation.”). 
36 JOHN S. BAKER, JR., HERITAGE FOUND., LEGAL MEMORANDUM, REVISITING THE 
EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF FEDERAL CRIMES 1 (June 16, 2008), available at http://s3.
amazonaws.com/thf_media/2008/pdf/lm26.pdf; see also Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, 
Many Failed Attempts to Count Federal Criminal Laws, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2011, at A10 
(reporting on numerous failed attempts to count the number of federal crimes and explaining 
that past numbers have merely been estimates). 
37  BAKER, supra note 36, at 1 (finding that federal crimes are growing at an “average [of] 
56.5 crimes per year”); John S. Baker, Jr., Measuring the Explosive Growth of Federal 
Crimes Legislation, 5 ENGAGE 23, 26 (2004), available at http://www.fed-soc.org/doclib/
20070321_oct04.pdf (discovering that over a seven-year period, Congress passed more new 
criminal sections in each election year than it did during all of that period’s nonelection 
sessions combined). 
38 William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 
513–14 (2001) (finding an approximately four-fold increase in Illinois’s criminal laws; a 
three-fold increase in Virginia’s laws, despite the elimination of slavery-related crimes; and 
a two-and-a-half-fold increase in Massachusetts’s laws since the 1850s—increases similar to 
the three-and-a-half-fold expansion in the U.S. Code’s criminal section over the same time 
period). 
39 State-court felony filings rose 31% from 1996 to 2005.  NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE 
COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT, 2006, at 137–39 tbl.7 
(2007) (totaling the individual state-court felony filings).  This rapid increase is in accord 
with Professor Stuntz’s finding of a 36% increase in state-court felony filings from 1978 to 
1984 and an additional 51% increase from 1985 to 1991.  William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining 
and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2555 n.9 (2004); see 
also Kay L. Levine & Ronald F. Wright, Prosecution in 3-D, 102 J. CRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1119, 1134 n.45 (2012) (reporting that a junior prosecutor “is likely to have 75–100 cases on 
her desk”).  But see COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS: 
AN ANALYSIS OF 2009 STATE COURT CASELOADS 20 (2011) (reporting that criminal 
caseloads have declined 4% since 2006—a record year for state-court criminal caseloads). 
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that go unprosecuted.40  This allows prosecutors to select the prosecutions 
they pursue and those they do not.  Further, directly in response to their 
large dockets, prosecutors rely on plea agreements.41  In state courts, plea 
agreements account for over 94% of felony convictions42 and this rate is 
even higher in federal courts.43  These agreements also often come early in 
an investigation when a prosecutor can dictate terms to a defendant before 
the defendant’s attorney has had time to investigate the case. 44  No one 
reviews prosecutors’ discretionary decisions to offer or not to offer such 
plea agreements.45  Taking charging and plea-bargaining powers together, 
prosecutors have large discretion in determining criminal sentences.  Often 
the prosecutor is setting the punishment for criminal acts with a force of law 
similar to that of the legislatures that write the initial law.46 
Prosecutorial discretion is reinforced by immunity from civil 
lawsuits.47  The first American case to extend immunity to a prosecutor was 
 
40 For instance, in fiscal year 1997, three years after the passage of the Violence Against 
Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902, there had not been a single 
federal prosecution based on this law.  AM. BAR ASS’N, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL 
LAW 20 (1998).  But see Letter from Caroline Frederickson, Director, ACLU, to Sen. Arlen 
Specter, Chair, U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (July 27, 2005), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/womens-rights/aclu-letter-senate-judiciary-committee-regarding-
violence-against-women-act-2005-s-119 (arguing that the Violence Against Women Act 
“dramatically improved the law enforcement response to violence against women” and 
should be reauthorized). 
41 Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 
50, 51 (1968) (arguing that without plea agreements, courts would be swamped with too 
many cases and too few resources). 
42 SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL.,  BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006, at 24 (2009). 
43 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIARY: DECEMBER 31, 2010, at 83 tbl.D-4 (reporting that in 2010, of the 89,373 federal 
convictions, 87,001 (97%) were through plea agreement); see also Plea Agreements, 1A 
FED. PRAC. & PROC. CRIM. § 180 (4th ed. & 2011 Supp.) (describing federal percentages that 
exceed state percentages). 
44 DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 44–45. 
45 Stuntz, supra note 39, at 2567. 
46 Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 
1471, 1513 (1993).  This “price setting” of criminal punishment even occurred despite 
mandatory federal sentencing guidelines, which could have restrained such negotiations.  See 
generally Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nage, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal 
Sentencing Guildelines: Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta 
Period, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1292 (1997) (arguing that federal prosecutors use tools like 
“fact bargaining” to get around mandatory sentences in plea-bargaining encounters).  This 
power has likely grown post-United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), where the 
Supreme Court struck down the mandatory nature of the sentencing guidelines. 
47 Scott J. Krischke, Absent Accountability: How Prosecutorial Impunity Hinders the 
Fair Administration of Justice in America, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 395, 399 (2010). 
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an 1896 Indiana Supreme Court decision affirming dismissal of a complaint 
for malicious prosecution.48  This decision became the majority rule in the 
United States.49  By 1927, the Supreme Court endorsed this rule50 by 
affirming per curiam the Second Circuit’s holding that a prosecutor “is 
immune from . . . malicious prosecution based on an indictment and 
prosecution . . . .” 51  The Second Circuit grounded this rule in public policy 
considerations.52  In 1976, the Supreme Court extended this common law 
rule of immunity to § 1983 civil rights claims.53  This holding was limited 
to the “judicial phase of the criminal process.”54 
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court further extended prosecutorial 
immunity.  In Van de Kamp v. Goldstein,55 the Court extended absolute 
immunity to administrative tasks, such as training, supervision, and 
management of information systems.56  The Court’s rationale for this 
expansion was that these administrative tasks relied on the prosecutor’s 
“legal knowledge and the exercise of related discretion.”57  In other 
circumstances, the Court has granted qualified immunity to provide a 
“defense of good faith” for prosecutors performing certain official duties.58  
These official duties include: (1) advising the police;59 (2) interacting with 
the media;60 and (3) testifying as a complaining witness.61  Qualified 
 
48 Griffith v. Slinkard, 44 N.E. 1001, 1002 (Ind. 1896) (“[I]f it be made in the due course 
of a legal or judicial proceeding, it is privileged, and cannot be the foundation of an action of 
defamation.”). 
49 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422 (1976); see also id. at 422 n.19 (collecting state 
cases from Kansas, Mississippi, North Dakota, and Oregon). 
50 Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d 396, 406 (2d Cir. 1926), aff’d per curiam, 275 U.S. 503 
(1927). 
51 Yaselli, 12 F.2d at 406. 
52 Id. (“The public interest requires that persons occupying such important positions and 
so closely identified with the judicial departments of the government should speak and act 
freely and fearlessly in the discharge of their important official functions.  They should be no 
more liable to private suits for what they say and do in the discharge of their duties than are 
the judges and jurors, to say nothing of the witnesses who testify in a case.”). 
53 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424. 
54 Id. at 430. 
55 555 U.S. 335 (2009). 
56 Id. at 339. 
57 Id. at 344. 
58 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967); see also John D. Kirby, Qualified Immunity 
for Civil Rights Violations: Refining the Standard, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 462, 470 (1990) 
(explaining the development of qualified immunity for public officials under § 1983). 
59 Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 495 (1991). 
60 Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269, 278 (1993) (applying a “functional 
approach” to extend absolute immunity only when a prosecutor is acting for the state at trial 
or in trial preparation, but not when the prosecutor acts as any other executive official would, 
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immunity will protect a prosecutor unless he or she knowingly violates 
clear constitutional standards.62 
Since absolute or qualified immunity will be extended to most actions 
of a prosecutor, one concern is that immunity leads to an increase in 
prosecutors pursuing wrongful convictions and violating defendants’ 
constitutional rights.63  Chief Judge Learned Hand worried that immunity 
was a “balance between the evils” of leaving “unredressed the wrongs done 
by dishonest officers” and subjecting “those who try to do their duty to the 
constant dread of retaliation.”64  In the end, Hand, like the Supreme Court, 
decided that immunity reinforcing discretion was preferable to the 
alternative.65  State legislatures have embraced this common law civil 
immunity through their statutes.66  In interpreting these statutes and their 
common law antecedents, state courts, similar to federal courts, provide 
absolute immunity to prosecutors for actions within the scope of their 
duties.67  All told, practical necessities and theoretical considerations make 
prosecutors powerful actors with protected, wide-ranging discretion. 
 
for instance in speaking at a press conference, where qualified immunity is proper). 
61 Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 132–33 (1997). 
62 Doe v. Phillips, 81 F.3d 1204, 1211 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. 
Ct. 2020, 2030–31 (2011) (explaining test for government officials in a case involving child 
protective services official and county sheriff); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 
(1982) (announcing this rule for government officials). 
63 See generally Krischke, supra note 47, at 412–13 (linking the increased use of 
prosecutorial pressure on former inmates to “snitch” on their peers with the racial disparity 
of prison populations to suggest an unfair administration of justice). 
64 Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949). 
65 Id. 
66 See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 821.6 (West 2012) (providing that a prosecutor “is not 
liable for injury caused . . . within the scope of his employment, even if he acts maliciously 
and without probable cause”); id. § 820.2 (providing that a government official, including a 
prosecutor, “is not liable for . . . the exercise of the discretion vested in him”); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 20-1-106.1(2) (West 2012) (“In the absence of the bad faith performance of the 
duties specified in this section, the district attorneys of the state of Colorado shall be immune 
from liability for the performance of said duties.”); GA. CONST. art. 6, § 8, ¶ 1(e) 
(“District attorneys shall enjoy immunity from private suit for actions arising from the 
performance of their duties.”); 42 PENN. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8546 (West 2007) (providing 
defenses at the common law); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-3-208 (2012) (providing that district 
attorneys “shall not be civilly or criminally liable for acts performed pursuant” to their 
duties). 
67 See, e.g., Falls v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 908, 915 (Ct. App. 1996) (providing 
absolute immunity for acts within the judicial process or associated with the judicial phase of 
the criminal process); Durham v. McElynn, 772 A.2d 68, 69  (Pa. 2001) (limiting absolute 
immunity to actions within scope of delegated authority). 
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B. THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH PROSECUTORIAL 
DISCRETION 
Beyond the theoretical concern of prosecutorial discretion thwarting 
the rule of law68 and the intuitive fear of untrained prosecutors using 
discretionary authority incorrectly, as implied in the previous section, 
discretion has also been blamed in a variety of situations where prosecutors 
cared more about winning a case than about justice.69  The resulting 
wrongful convictions are more prevalent than one would hope.  For 
instance, since the advent of DNA testing, there have been 301 exonerations 
in the United States of convicted prisoners.70  In 1999, Chicago Tribune 
staff writers surveyed nationwide cases and found that 381 homicide 
convictions have been overturned since 1963 because the “prosecutors 
concealed evidence suggesting innocence or presented evidence they knew 
to be false.”71  In sixty-seven of the cases, the defendant had been sentenced 
to death, and over half of those former death row inmates were 
subsequently released.72  The authors of the report noted that the frequency 
of such withholdings is likely much higher than they found because they 
only examined homicide cases.73  A year earlier, the Pittsburgh Post-
Gazette’s Bill Moushey reviewed over 1,500 allegations of prosecutorial 
misconduct over a period of ten years and reached a similar conclusion.74  
In his review, the author found “hundreds of examples of discovery 
violations in which prosecutors intentionally concealed evidence that might 
have helped prove a defendant innocent or a witness against him suspect.”75 
The effect of such actions by prosecutors on defendants is well 
chronicled.76  In a particularly egregious example, two men were 
 
68 See supra notes 27–34 and accompanying text. 
69 See, e.g., DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 4 (discussing her time at the 
Public Defender Service for the District of Columbia and stating that she found that most 
prosecutors saw their role as winning—i.e., getting a conviction in—every case); John 
Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion—A Comment, 60 NW. U. L. REV. 174, 180–81 (1965) 
(detailing a former prosecutor’s admission that win–loss record affects status within the 
office).  Compare these admissions with the meaning of justice: “That end which ought to be 
reached in a case by the regular administration of the principles of law involved as applied to 
the facts.”  BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 696 (3d ed. 1969). 
70 INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Dec. 7, 2012). 
71 Armstrong & Possley, The Verdict, supra note 26, at 1.  
72 Id.  Those that were not released were likely reprosecuted with this additional evidence 
included in the case. 
73 Id. 
74 Bill Moushey, Discovery Violations Have Made Evidence-Gathering a Shell Game, 
PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 24, 1998, at A-1.  
75 Id. 
76 See, e.g., DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE, supra note 21, at 3–4, 132–34; Edward M. 
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wrongfully accused of murdering a ten-year-old girl.77  The main evidence 
that linked the two men to the crime was a lie told by a police officer that 
one of the men had a “vision” of the crime scene that only someone on hand 
for the murder would have known.78  Meanwhile, prosecutors did not 
pursue leads relating to a different man who pleaded guilty to two other 
murders, including that of another young female.79  At a third trial, after 
new DNA evidence surfaced excluding the accused of being the murderers, 
a judge returned a verdict of not guilty.80  The participants—three 
prosecutors and four police officers—were later indicted and then acquitted 
for the criminal conspiracy of creating the vision lie.81 
A prosecutor’s desire to win his case, either for individual reasons or 
as the result of incentive programs, may lead him to take actions that are not 
within ethical or legal bounds.82  For instance, the Denver Post reported in 
2011 that a district attorney’s office offered prosecutors a monetary award, 
averaging $1,100, based in part on their felony conviction rates.83  The 
 
Genson & Marc W. Martin, The Epidemic of Prosecutorial Courtroom Misconduct in 
Illinois: Is it Time to Start Prosecuting the Prosecutors?, 19 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 39, 39–41 
(1987). 
77 Rolando Cruz, CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, http://www.law.northwestern.edu/
cwc/exonerations/ilCruzSummary.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2012) [hereinafter Cruz, CTR. 
ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS].  See also generally THOMAS FRISBIE & RANDY GARRETT, 
VICTIMS OF JUSTICE REVISITED ch. 5 (rev. ed. 2005) (reporting the detailed story of the 
Rolando Cruz prosecution). 
78 Maurice Possley & Ken Armstrong, Trial & Error: Prosecution on Trial in DuPage, 
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 12, 1999, at 1 [hereinafter Prosecution on Trial]. 
79 Id. 
80 Cruz, CTR. ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, supra note 77. 
81 Possley & Armstrong, Prosecution on Trial, supra note 78. 
82 This does not mean that an incentive program could not positively reward behaviors 
leading to fairness.  See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Holder 
Recognizes DOJ Employees and Others for Their Service at Annual Awards Ceremony (Oct. 
27, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/October/10-ag-1207.html 
(recognizing and rewarding Department of Justice officials at annual award ceremony for 
contributions to the Department).  See generally Stephanos Bibas, Rewarding Prosecutors 
for Performance, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 441, 442 (2009) (encouraging a pay-for-
performance model centered on certain desired behaviors); Tracy L. Meares, Rewards for 
Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial 
Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 873–75 (1995) (proposing that prosecutors be 
evaluated on whether they secured convictions or plea agreements on the same charge(s) 
they brought initially to disincentivize adding charges in an effort to secure plea 
agreements).  Instead, this is more a statement about the types of financial programs that 
have been implemented. 
83 Jessica Fender, DA Chambers Offers Bonuses for Prosecutors Who Hit Conviction 
Targets, DENVERPOST.COM (Apr. 11, 2011, 3:43 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/news/
ci_17686874. 
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reporter noted that this was an unusual scheme as prosecutors from other 
jurisdictions in the state believed that their prosecutors should be seeking 
justice as an incentive in itself.84  The district attorney even acknowledged 
that there could be concerns of prosecutors “cherry-picking” easier cases to 
ensure convictions.85  But instead of ending the program, the district 
attorney in charge of the office responded that the bonus was easily 
attainable enough not to encourage such cherry-picking to attain the 
bonus.86  While this may be true, the potential for and, at least, the 
appearance of impropriety are present. 
In another particularly disturbing “incentive program” during the 
1970s, Chicago prosecutors had a contest to be the first person to convict 
two tons of defendants.87  The “game” required prosecutors to literally 
weigh convicted felons on a scale.88  The winning prosecutor would be the 
first person whose convicted defendants weighed a total of two tons.89  
Making the situation even harder to rationalize, the mainly white 
prosecutors described their trials and “contest” in racially explicit terms.”90 
More recently, special counsel Henry Schuelke reported on the 
misconduct of those within the Alaska U.S. Attorney’s Office in the 
conviction of Senator Ted Stevens of Alaska on federal corruption 
charges.91  Before sentencing, the Department of Justice moved to set aside 
the conviction after discovering undisclosed material information that all 
agreed was required to be turned over to defense attorneys before trial.92  
Such information would have strengthened and supported Senator Stevens’s 
explanation and defense of the charges in the corruption probe.93  After an 
investigation of the incident, special counsel Schuelke rejected the proffered 
rationale for the mistake and concluded that the two lead prosecutors 





87 Maurice Possley & Ken Armstrong, Trial & Error: The Flip Side of a Fair Trial, CHI. 
TRIB., Jan. 11, 1999, at 1. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. (calling the courthouses where they worked “Darkham” and “Rolling Ghettos,” and 
calling the contest “N[-----]s by the Pound”). 
91 Report to Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan of Investigation Conducted Pursuant to the Court’s 
Order, dated April 7, 2009 at 1–2, In re Special Proceedings, No. 1:09-mc-00198-EGS 
(D.D.C. Nov. 14, 2011). 
92 Id. at 32. 
93 Id. at 38. 
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which was required to be disclosed.”94  Implicit in the report is the charge 
that the prosecutors intentionally withheld material information out of a 
desire to win—potentially for career advancement through prosecuting a 
sitting U.S. Senator—and an inherent conflict of interest in reviewing what 
information should be given to the other side.95 
Prosecutorial discretion has led to practical problems and socially 
unacceptable results.  Whether caused by an individual desire to win, 
incentive programs, or simply mistakes, discretion can lead to incorrect 
convictions and ruined lives. 
C. BASIC LIMITS ON PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
The legal system attempts to impose limits on discretion in response to 
these unacceptable results.96  The reason for limiting discretion is to reduce 
the threat to individual freedoms.97  One of these discretion limitations is 
the constitutional requirement, as developed by the Supreme Court, of 
certain procedural safeguards for the accused.  These safeguards reinforce 
Justice Sutherland’s oft-quoted 1935 opinion in Berger v. United States that 
a prosecutor’s goal “in a criminal prosecution is not that [she] shall win a 
case, but that justice shall be done.”98  In that case, the Supreme Court 
reversed a conviction because the prosecutor’s misconduct had a “probable 
cumulative effect upon the jury,” biasing jurors against the defendant.99 
The petitioner in Berger had been indicted along with seven other 
defendants in two separate criminal conspiracies to counterfeit Federal 
Reserve Bank notes.100  There was no direct evidence linking the petitioner 
to one of the conspiracies; the evidence only showed him potentially 
passing notes in the second conspiracy without further criminal activity.101  
However, he was convicted at a trial during which the U.S. Attorney 
“overstepped the bounds of . . . propriety and fairness” by: (1) misstating 
facts; (2) falsely attributing statements to witnesses; (3) suggesting out-of-
court statements by his questions; (4) assuming prejudicial information not 
 
94 Id. at 36. 
95 William M. Welch & William W. Taylor, The Brady Problem: Time to Face Reality, 
NAT’L L.J., July 16, 2012, at 44–46. 
96 Cf. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125, 125 n.9 (1979) (stating that 
prosecutor discretion cannot implicate impermissible standards like “race, religion, or other 
arbitrary classification”). 
97 Breitel, supra note 27, at 428. 
98 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
99 Id. at 89. 
100 Id. at 79–80. 
101 Id. at 80. 
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presented as evidence; and (5) bullying witnesses.102  The Court seemed 
disturbed that these improprieties were used to suggest that the petitioner 
was a part of both conspiracies since the evidence could only tie him to 
one.103  In concluding, Justice Sutherland wrote, “[W]hile [the prosecutor] 
may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.  It is as much 
his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful 
conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just 
one.”104 
One way that the law has attempted to rein in prosecutorial discretion 
is through required disclosures of certain evidence to the defense.  For 
instance, upon a defendant’s request, the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure require a prosecutor to provide to the defense oral or written 
statements made by the defendant that the prosecutor plans to use at trial.105  
In addition, upon request, the prosecution is required to provide documents 
and objects that are material to preparing a defense or will be a part of the 
government’s case-in-chief, in addition to a summary of expected expert 
witness testimony; the defendant’s criminal record; and reports from any 
physical, mental, or scientific tests.106 
States may also require these disclosures and others from prosecutors.  
For instance, Illinois requires the same disclosures upon request that the 
federal rules provide.107  In addition, the state requires disclosure if a 
defendant requests information about anticipated witnesses, including any 
prior criminal record(s); statements by codefendants; and portions of grand 
jury hearing transcripts.108  The state also requires disclosure, with or 
without a request, of electronic surveillance the state conducted on the 
defendant and any material evidence that tends to negate the guilt of the 
accused.109  The prosecution must also provide to the defendant reports of 
any DNA evidence at issue in the trial.110  Similarly, other states, such as 
 
102 Id. at 84. 
103 See id. at 81. 
104 Id. at 88. 
105 FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(A), (B). 
106 Id. at 16(a)(1)(D)–(G); see also Terence F. MacCarthy & Rosalie Lindsay Guimarães, 
Pretrial Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, in FEDERAL CRIMINAL PRACTICE ch. 7 (2011) 
(explaining the federal rules for practicing attorneys). 
107 ILL. SUP. CT. R. 412(a)(ii), (iv), (v), (vi).  
108 Id. at (a)(i)–(vi). 
109 Id. at (b)–(c). 
110 ILL. SUP. CT. R. 417.  For a fuller explanation of the Illinois state rules, see Leonard 
C. Goodman, Illinois Criminal Pretrial Discovery, in DEFENDING ILLINOIS CRIMINAL CASES, 
at ch. 4 (Thomas A. Lilien ed., 2010). 
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Maryland111 and Arizona,112 provide in their criminal procedure rules for 
mandatory material evidence disclosures without request and additional 
items upon the defense’s request.  Each of these codes attempts to provide 
information necessary to give the defense a fair trial. 
Federal and state procedural codes are just one way of regulating 
discretion.  Courts have also added their own requirements on prosecutors.  
One such regulation is the Brady doctrine described in the next part. 
D. BRADY AND ITS PROGENY REQUIRE DISCLOSURE OF 
MATERIAL EVIDENCE 
The Supreme Court held in the seminal Brady v. Maryland case that 
“suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon 
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or 
to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the 
prosecution.”113  In the case, John Brady and Charles Boblit planned to rob 
a man for his car and his money.114  At gunpoint, Brady and Boblit drove 
the victim to a nearby forest where they strangled him to death.115  A jury 
convicted John Brady of first-degree murder and sentenced him to death, 
while in a separate trial, Boblit was also convicted and sentenced to 
death.116  Maryland prosecutors tried Brady first; he admitted participating 
in the robbery leading to the murder, but claimed that Boblit “did the actual 
killing.”117 
At trial, Brady’s attorneys conceded that he was guilty of first-degree 
murder through the felony-murder rule but asked the jury to sentence him 
“without capital punishment” due to Brady’s claim that he did not actually 
kill the victim.118  Unfortunately, the prosecution did not provide the 
defendant access, despite requests, to all of Boblit’s extrajudicial 
statements.119  One of those statements contained his admission to being the 
killer.120  On appeal, the Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed Brady’s 
 
111 MD. R. 4-262(d). 
112 ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 15.1; see also C.P. Jhong, Annotation, Right of Accused in State 
Courts to Inspection or Disclosure of Evidence in Possession of Prosecution, 7 A.L.R.3d 8 
(1966) (reporting on various state disclosure laws). 
113 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
114 Brady v. State, 154 A.2d 434, 434 (Md. 1959). 
115 Id. 
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conviction but remanded the sentencing phase of the trial to allow Brady to 
use Boblit’s statement because of his Fourteenth Amendment rights.121 
The Supreme Court affirmed,122 acknowledging the Maryland Court of 
Appeals’ conclusion that the excluded statement could not reduce Brady’s 
conviction below first-degree murder and thus left the state law ruling 
untouched.123  In doing so, however, the Court for the first time ruled that a 
defendant was entitled to all “evidence favorable to an accused upon 
request”124 under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.125 
After Brady and the requirement of disclosure upon request of material 
evidence, the Court heard a number of cases on the meaning and reach of 
the Brady doctrine.  Potentially most importantly, after a nine-year 
detour,126 the Court held that “material” evidence must be made available to 
the accused with or without request.127  In United States v. Bagley, after the 
defense made a general request for information, evidence that could have 
impeached the prosecution’s key witnesses—namely that the witnesses had 
been paid $300 to testify—was not provided.128  After the defense 
discovered this information through a Freedom of Information Act request, 
the defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the disclosure of this 
impeachable evidence would have changed the result of his trial and the 
failure to disclose denied him the due process rights guaranteed by 
Brady.129  The district court disagreed130 but the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit reversed, suggesting that by not providing information for 
cross-examination, the prosecutor violated the defendant’s right to a fair 
 
121 Id. at 85. 
122 Id. at 91. 
123 Id. at 90. 
124 Id. at 87.  The importance of the word “requested” was underscored in later decisions 
of the Court.  See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (“In Brady the request 
was specific . . . [giving] the prosecutor notice of exactly what the defense desired.”); Moore 
v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794–95 (1972) (“Important, then, are (a) suppression by the 
prosecution after a request by the defense, (b) the evidence’s favorable character for the 
defense, and (c) the materiality of the evidence.”); see also BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 5:2, at 220 (2d ed. 2011) (explaining that it was these 
subsequent cases that clarified Brady’s focus on specific requests for favorable material 
evidence). 
125 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV. 
126 Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103–07 (defining three different categories of disclosure 
information dependent on whether the accused requested the information and fashioning a 
test for each category). 
127 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 672 (1985). 
128 Id. at 671. 
129 Id. at 671–72. 
130 Id. at 673. 
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trial.131 
The Court rejected this “automatic reversal” and remanded the case.132  
Instead of the Ninth Circuit’s test or a previous Court test based on the 
general request, the undisclosed impeachment evidence should have been 
analyzed under the Brady materiality standard regardless of whether or how 
it was requested.133  Under this standard, an appeals court must reverse a 
conviction “only if the evidence is material in the sense that its suppression 
undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.”134  The standard for 
making this determination in all Brady reviews is a fact-intensive inquiry on 
the “reasonable probability” that the trial was fair without this evidence 
being shared with the defendant.135  On remand, the Ninth Circuit again 
reversed and vacated Bagley’s conviction.136 
Since Bagley, U.S. courts have continued to struggle with Brady 
determinations.  For instance, some courts continue to distinguish between 
circumstances where the defendant requested material information and 
those where he did not.137  Subsequent case law revealed that the lower 
courts’ question with respect to undisclosed evidence is “whether in its 
absence[,] [the defendant] received a fair trial, understood as a trial 
resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.”138  The Court went on to 
redefine this as “[a] ‘reasonable probability’ of a different result” when “the 
government’s evidentiary suppression ‘undermines confidence in the 
outcome of the trial.’”139  It is not surprising with such a subjective test that 
further analysis and exposition by the Supreme Court, lower federal courts, 
and state courts have been necessary. 
 
131 See Bagley v. Lumpkin, 719 F.2d 1462, 1464 (9th Cir. 1983), rev’d sub nom. United 
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985). 
132 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 674. 
133 Id. at 676. 
134 Id. at 678. 
135 Id. at 684; id. at 685 (White, J., concurring). 
136 Bagley v. Lumpkin, 798 F.2d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 1986). 
137 See, e.g., Johnson v. Gibson, 169 F.3d 1239, 1254–55 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[A] request 
for specific information, as opposed to a general request . . . can lower the threshold of 
materiality necessary to establish a violation.”); United States v. Vozzella, 124 F.3d 389, 392 
(2d Cir. 1997) (utilizing the Agurs three-level analysis); Smith v. Sec’y of N.M. Dep’t. of 
Corr., 50 F.3d 801, 826 (10th Cir. 1995) (noting that it is “more prudent for defense counsel 
to at least make a ‘general request’ for Brady material” than not to make any request); 
United States v. Joseph, 996 F.2d 36, 40 (3d Cir. 1993) (distinguishing a case with a specific 
request from a case where there was a general request); see also ABA STANDARDS FOR 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-311(b) (1993) (prosecutor should make a “reasonably diligent effort to 
comply with a legally proper discovery request”). 
138 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995). 
139 Id. (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678). 
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A study of federal post-Brady reversals involving undisclosed 
evidence reveals some trends.140  For instance, exculpating evidence is 
more likely to be material than impeachment evidence141 and repetitive or 
cumulative information is ordinarily not material.142  However, the inquiry 
remains fact-intensive; if the prosecution’s case is filled with “gaps,”143 
includes “weaknesses and uncertainties,”144 “suggestive of . . . another 
perpetrator,”145 or is otherwise “tenuous,”146 the evidence withheld is more 
likely to be material. 
Post-Brady and Bagley, courts engage in a post hoc analysis of 
whether undisclosed evidence was material; the task for a prosecutor is 
much more difficult—an ex ante pretrial consideration of whether a piece of 
information will interact with potential trial evidence to the point where it 
will impact the case’s outcome.147  As a prosecutor is not under an 
obligation to disclose the entire investigative file,148 the modern prosecutor 
must struggle with this Brady analysis.  The test is fact-specific and is 
therefore inexact and complex, and it requires much training and 
understanding on the part of a prosecutor.149  But the obligation is also 
counter to a prosecutor’s natural inclination.  The obligation asks 
prosecutors to stand in defense counsel’s shoes, consider what information 
they would want, and then “reveal information that makes conviction less 
likely.”150 
Under Justice Thomas’s view, this complicated test works because 
prosecutors have “professional training and ethical obligations.”151  
Unfortunately, as outlined in the next section and as Justice Ginsburg 
 
140 Jason B. Binimow, Annotation, Constitutional Duty of Federal Prosecutor to 
Disclose Brady Evidence Favorable to Accused, 158 A.L.R. FED. 401 (1999 & Westlaw 
Supp. 2011). 
141 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 164, 171 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Boyette v. 
Lefevre, 246 F.3d 76, 92 (2d Cir. 2001). 
142 See, e.g., Simental v. Matrisciano, 363 F.3d 607, 611 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. 
Imbruglia, 617 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1980). 
143 United States v. Sheehan, 442 F. Supp. 1003, 1009 (D. Mass. 1977). 
144 State v. Falkins, 356 So. 2d 415, 419 (La. 1978). 
145 Scurr v. Niccum, 620 F.2d 186, 191  (8th Cir. 1980); see also State v. Spurlock, 874 
S.W.2d 602, 616–17 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (holding that the prosecutor needed to turn 
over audio recordings implicating another person as the criminal actor). 
146 Monroe v. Angelone, 323 F.3d 286, 312 (4th Cir. 2003). 
147 Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor’s Office, 31 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2089, 2092 (2010). 
148 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111 (1976). 
149 Barkow, supra note 147, at 2097–98. 
150 Welch & Taylor, supra note 95, at 45. 
151 Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1363 (2011). 
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feared, this training is simply inadequate, calling into question whether the 
Brady doctrine delivers on its due process guarantees and how it impacts 
the lives of criminal defendants. 
III. POLICY PROPOSALS TO END PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT FAIL BY 
NOT ADDRESSING PROSECUTORIAL TRAINING 
A. PROSECUTORS LACK APPROPRIATE TRAINING 
Despite a prosecutor’s power and discretion, the only legal 
requirement for becoming a prosecutor is often no more than admission to 
the state’s bar.152  The National District Attorneys Association’s suggestion 
is to require that “a prosecutor . . . be a member in good standing of the 
state’s bar, except as otherwise provided by law.”153  This suggestion 
applies for prosecutors that are elected, appointed, or hired.154  For the most 
part, states have not added additional requirements for hired prosecutors.155 
However, some states add additional requirements for those who are in 
leadership positions or are elected.156  Most often, this simply is a 
requirement that the individual is a resident within the office’s jurisdiction, 
rather than that the individual meets any training or skill requirements.157  
The reason for this location requirement for lead prosecutors, even if not 
elected, is a preference that they be available to interact with the 
represented community, including local police and judicial officials, and be 
 
152 Admittedly, individual offices may have higher standards for hiring an attorney. 
153 NAT’L DISTRICT ATT’YS ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 1-4.1 (3d ed. 
2009) [hereinafter NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS]. 
154 Id. 
155 See, e.g., MICH. OP. ATT’Y GEN. No. 803 (1948), at 740 (requiring that individual be 
admitted to the bar to be qualified to be a prosecutor) (citing People ex rel. Hughes v. May, 3 
Mich. 598 (1855)); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 56.010–20 (West 1998) (adding only requirement to 
be twenty-one years old); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41:10-a (LexisNexis 2009) (appointing 
municipal prosecutors who must be “members of the New Hampshire bar” and “serve at the 
pleasure of the appointing authority”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 309.02 (West 2005) 
(providing that the only requirement is being licensed to practice law). 
156 See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. V, § 26(a) (1974) (requiring practice in state for five years 
preceding election); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:158-1 (West 2011) (head county prosecutor must 
have been in practice in the state for at least five years). 
157 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 31-2601 (West 2006) (stating that elected prosecutor 
must live in the county he or she will serve); LA. CONST. art. V, § 26(a) (1974) (requiring 
two years residence in the county that the prosecutor will represent); MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 56.010 (adding a requirement to be a resident of the county for twelve months prior to an 
election); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.27.010 (West 2003) (requiring elected prosecutor to 
be a qualified elector of the county of the election).  See also NATIONAL PROSECUTION 
STANDARDS, supra note 153, at § 1-4.1. 
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available in the case of an emergency.158  In addition, many states also add 
that a prosecutor cannot hold another office while in the role.159  For the 
most part then, America’s prosecutors only need to be qualified to practice 
in their respective states, which will usually entail graduating from law 
school and passing the bar,160 as Justice Thomas felt was adequate.161 
To understand if these state requirements actually prepare prosecutors 
for practice, I reviewed the listed curriculums of the 202 law schools 
accredited by the American Bar Association (ABA).  The study found that 
all schools offer courses in general criminal law and criminal procedure.163  
In addition, all but six law schools require criminal law as part of the 
school’s graduation requirements.164  On the other hand, only 53 ABA-
accredited schools, or just over a quarter of all accredited schools, require a 
criminal procedure course to earn a degree.165  Figure 1, infra, illustrates 
that the more recent a school’s ABA accreditation, the more likely it is to 
require criminal procedure.166  Yet even with this trend, most schools do not 
 
158 NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 153, at § 1-4 cmt.  
159 See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. V, § 26(c) (1974) (prohibiting criminal defense work during 
time in office); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 31-2601 (West 2011) (stating that no other office may 
be held); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7A-61 (2011) (stating that a prosecutor “shall not engage 
in the private practice of law”). 
160 But see STANDING ROCK SIOUX TRIBE CODE OF JUSTICE § 1-502 (1986) (amended 
1991) (requiring age, high moral character, non-felon, physical ability to carry out the role, 
and no dishonorable discharges from the military, in addition to bar admission and 
graduation from an accredited law school).  
161 Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1363 (2011) (“Prosecutors not only are 
equipped but are ethically bound to know what Brady entails and to perform legal research 
when they are uncertain.”). 
163 Note that not all law schools name their courses in the same way—some judgment 
calls had to be made.  However, it was typically clear from course descriptions that a course 
in “Criminal Justice” dealing with the common law antecedents of the Model Penal Code 
was equivalent to a course in criminal law.  Similarly, criminal procedure is a diverse topic 
that could encompass the federal rules of criminal procedure or the constitutional doctrines 
at work in criminal processes.  Since, depending on the professor and the case book, 
discovery doctrines can be discussed in both, this analysis considered courses ranging from 
“Constitutional Criminal Procedure” to “Criminal Adjudication” to “Criminal Practice” as 
being under the heading of criminal procedure. 
164 The six schools without criminal law as a required course are: Creighton University 
School of Law, Lewis and Clark College Law School, the University of Arizona James E. 
Rogers College of Law, University of Miami School of Law, University of New Hampshire 
School of Law, and William Mitchell College of Law.  See infra Appendix. 
165 See infra Appendix. 
166 A similar trend exists when you compare the law schools classified as tier one by U.S. 
News & World Report (only three out of fifty-three require criminal procedure) with those 
classified as tier four (twenty-four of the forty-five require criminal procedure).  If these 
schools are also producing the most prosecutors, this trend may assist in training future 
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require criminal procedure to graduate.  That said, a number of schools list 
the course as being a “preference course,”167 a course to prepare for the bar 
examination,168 one “[a]ll law students should take,”169 or one of only a 
couple first-year electives.170 
Figure 1 
Does a Law School Require Criminal Procedure? 
However, even if a law school requires criminal procedure, a law 
student may not learn about the Brady doctrine or the constitutional 
requirement to turn over material evidence. Different casebooks provide 
different pedagogical views171 and may only peripherally reference Brady v. 
 
prosecutors.   
167 See, e.g., NOVA SOUTHEASTERN UNIVERSITY, SHEPARD BROAD LAW CENTER, 
http://nsulaw.nova.edu/students/course-descriptions.cfm (last visited Nov. 18, 2012) 
(including Criminal Procedure in a menu of three courses from which students must select 
two). 
168 See, e.g., UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO SCHOOL OF LAW, http://www.sandiego.edu/law/
academics/jd/curriculum/graduation_requirements.php (last visited Nov. 18, 2012). 
169 See, e.g., UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, GOULD SCHOOL OF LAW, http://law
web.usc.edu/why/academics/curriculum/upperDivision.cfm (last visited Nov. 18, 2012). 
170 See, e.g., VILLANOVA UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, http://www.law.villanova.edu/
Academics/Degree Programs/JD/First Year.aspx (last visited Nov. 18, 2012). 
171 Compare ARNOLD H. LOEWY, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, AND 
QUESTIONS (3d ed. 2010) (containing thirty-two short chapters on topics ranging from 
sentencing questions to Miranda warnings to probable cause searches without a higher level 
organizational framework), with RONALD J. ALLEN ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE FOURTH, FIFTH, AND SIXTH AMENDMENTS AND 
RELATED AREAS (3d ed. 1995) (organizing material into three larger topic areas: an 
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Maryland.172  Nor do all bar exams ensure that such information is 
understood before admission to the bar.173  Therefore, there can be no 
guarantee that new prosecutors either understand or have studied important 
procedural doctrines, such as Brady. 
Students leaving law schools without proper knowledge is not a 
problem unique to prosecutors’ offices.174  However, unlike a law firm that 
could simply reduce attorneys’ starting salaries to pay for training, most 
prosecutors’ offices are small and do not provide large salaries to reduce.175  
 
introduction to the criminal process, the right to counsel, and the right to be left alone). 
172 See, e.g., ALLEN ET AL., supra note 171, at 96–97 (citing Brady in an edited version of 
a different case); ANDREW E. TASLITZ, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 771 (3d ed. 
2007) (referencing Brady in a footnote as support for statement that “prosecutors are 
constitutionally obliged to turn over to the defense . . . all material, exculpatory evidence”); 
WELSH S. WHITE & JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONSTRAINTS UPON INVESTIGATION AND PROOF 706 (4th ed. 2001) (citing Brady to indicate 
the “ethical responsibility of the prosecutor” in an edited version of a case on right to 
counsel).  But see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & LAURIE L. LEVENSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 621–
22 (2008) (containing an edited version of Brady in a section entitled “Constitutional 
Discovery: A One-Way Street”). 
173 For instance, the Louisiana bar examination does not require knowledge of Brady to 
pass the criminal procedure or criminal law section of the bar, since such questions make up 
less than 10% of the points allocated on those sections from 1980 to 2010.  Connick v. 
Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1385–86 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting one would 
not even need to pass those two sections to pass the exam).  This continues.  No questions on 
Brady were asked on the 2011 written exam.  See Louisiana State Bar Exam, LA. SUPREME 
CT. COMMITTEE B. ADMISSIONS (July 25, 2011), http://www.lascba.org/exams/Questions
July2011.pdf.  More broadly applicable, the National Conference of Bar Examiners, which 
develops the Multistate Bar Exam given in forty-eight states, does not include Brady or 
disclosure obligations in its list of covered topics for the criminal procedure section of the 
test.  See Subject Matter Outlines, NAT’L CONF. B. EXAMINERS, http://www.ncbex.org/assets/
media_files/Information-Booklets/SMOs-from-MBEIB2012.pdf (last visited Nov. 18, 2012). 
174 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, In Memoriam: Bernard D. Meltzer (1914–2007), 74 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 435, 435, 437–38 (2007) (arguing that since the 1960s, law schools have moved 
from a focus on the profession to a focus on academic debate and this may diminish the 
preparation law schools provide to students); Ashby Jones & Joseph Palazzolo, What’s a 
First-Year Lawyer Worth?—Not Much, Say a Growing Number of Corporate Clients Who 
Refuse to Pay, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2011, at B1 (reporting that “more than 20% of . . . in-
house legal departments . . . are refusing to pay for the work of first- or second-year 
attorneys, in at least some matters”); David Segal, What They Don’t Teach Law Students: 
Lawyering, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2011, at A1 (indicating that law school graduates are not 
trained in the basic legal issues they will be working on in law firms and that many law firm 
clients refused to pay hourly rates of first- and second-year associates).  But see Aaron N. 
Taylor, Why Law School is Still Worth It, NAT’L JURIST, Nov. 2011, at 4 (arguing that law 
school is still worth the expense and prepares law students for a financially lucrative career); 
Michelle Weyenberg, Practice Ready, NAT’L JURIST, Oct. 2011, at 16 (reporting that a 
number of law schools are changing how they teach to ensure law graduates are “practice-
ready for the real world”). 
175 The average prosecutor’s office in the United States, including part-time offices with 
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The financial resources of these offices are not usually high, and are 
certainly less than even those of small private law firms.176  Complicating 
matters, prosecutors’ offices face both high turnover and recruitment 
troubles.177  Taken together, these factors place greater import on the 
incomplete knowledge of recent law school graduates and other new 
prosecutor hires.  Unfortunately, despite the need for formal training, most 
training for new prosecutors is “training by fire.”178 
The National District Attorneys Association (NDAA) has long advised 
the creation of training programs: “[P]rosecutors should participate in 
formal training and education programs [and] . . . should seek out 
continuing legal education opportunities that focus specifically on the 
 
a part-time chief prosecutor, has 9 staff members (both attorneys and support staff) and a 
median salary of $85,000.  PERRY, supra note 25, at 3.  However, even large offices serving 
municipalities of over 1 million people have a median salary for the chief prosecutor of only 
$149,000, comparable to the starting salaries at many large law firms.  Id.  These numbers 
have stayed consistent over the last decade, CAROL J. DEFRANCES, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2001, at 2–3 (2002) 
(reporting an average office size of nine staff members with an $85,000 median salary for 
the chief prosecutor), but have grown since the mid-1990s, CAROL J. DEFRANCES & GREG W. 
STEADMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE 
COURTS, 1996, at 1 (1998) (reporting the same average office size in 1996 but with a $64,000 
median salary for the chief prosecutor). 
176 The median annual budget for prosecutors’ offices in this country is $355,000.  
PERRY, supra note 25, at 1.  This amount is roughly equivalent to the average revenue per 
lawyer in 2009 at small private law firms with between two and eight attorneys, which 
would indicate that even these small firms have significantly more resources at their disposal 
than the average prosecutor’s office in this country.  The Survey of Law Firm Economics: 
How Small and Midsize Firms Weathered the Storm, NAT’L L.J. (Aug. 30, 2010), 
http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/nlj/SLFE_graphics.pdf (reporting that the average revenue per 
partner at these small firms was $350,000). 
177 PERRY, supra note 25, at 3 (reporting that 24% of offices had problems recruiting new 
staff, while 35% of offices had problems retaining staff); see also Armstrong & Possley, The 
Verdict, supra note 26, at 1 (noting that Orleans Parish District Attorney Harry Connick Sr. 
has a staff of 80 prosecutors, 30 of whom are new every year).  But see DEFRANCES, supra 
note 175, at 1 (comparing favorably the number of full-time chief prosecutors in 2001 when 
over three-fourths of all chief prosecutors were full-time, to 1990 when about half of chief 
prosecutors were full-time). 
178 Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of 
Federal Prosecutors, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553, 569 (1999).  This mentor–mentee training 
may indeed be worse than formal training if young prosecutors are learning from those who 
have committed Brady violations for competitive advantage in the past and are unrepentant.  
For instance, would informal training from the prosecutors participating in the two-ton 
conviction “game” be good?  See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text.  Professors 
Levine and Wright’s qualitiative study published earlier in this Issue reinforces the 
importance prosecutors place on mentorship.  Levine & Wright, supra note 39, at 1163 
(reporting that one prosecutor said about a mentor “that’s where my training came from”). 
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prosecution function.”179  Other national organizations have also assisted in 
sharing training best practices since at least the 1970s.180  For example, the 
ABA has recommended that “[t]raining programs should be established . . . 
for new personnel and for continuing education of the staff.”181  Yet, it does 
not appear that these suggestions have been implemented across the nation.  
In fact, young prosecutors—faced with heavy caseloads, lower pay than 
other attorneys, and long hours—often do not have the time to reflect or 
learn from their on-the-job training.182 
Similarly, both the NDAA and the ABA suggest offices provide 
prosecutors with handbooks and manuals to assist the offices’ work and 
“guide the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.”183  Apart from the 
Department of Justice, which produces the United States Attorneys’ 
Manual,184 there is little evidence that many state or local prosecutors’ 
offices develop these manuals.185  In the end, many new prosecutors, as 
Justice Ginsburg fears, are simply not receiving the training—either in law 
school or in their new positions—necessary to follow complex criminal 
procedures such as the Brady doctrine. 
B. PROPOSALS TO OVERCOME MISCONDUCT HAVE NOT 
INCREASED TRAINING 
Legal scholars, perceiving the situations outlined earlier in this 
Comment, have sought ways to reduce the number of prosecutorial 
misconduct issues that accused defendants face.  These proposed solutions 
 
179 NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 153, § 1-5.3. 
180 See generally NAT’L ASS’N ATT’YS GEN., COMM. OFFICE ATT’Y GEN., PROSECUTOR 
TRAINING AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS (1972); NAT’L ASS’N ATT’YS GEN., COMM. OFFICE 
ATT’Y GEN., TRAINING AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR LOCAL PROSECUTORS (1978). 
181 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, Standard 3-
2.6 (1993) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE]. 
182 Alafair S. Burke, Revisiting Prosecutorial Disclosure, 84 IND. L.J. 481, 498 (2009); 
Levenson, supra note 178. 
183 NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 153, § 1-5.4; see also ABA 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 181, Standard 3-2.5 (recommending that the 
guide be public except for “confidential” matters). 
184 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL (1997 & amdts.), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/ [hereinafter 
UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL]. 
185 See Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful 
Convictions: Shaping Remedies for A Broken System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399, 422 n.123 
(reporting that in thirty years of practice the author had not seen a published manual or 
guideline in several cities and counties throughout two states).  But see Levine & Wright, 
supra note 39, at 1150 (reporting that one of the three surveyed prosecutorial offices had a 
“forty-page manual”). 
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have implicated all three branches of government, indicating that the 
failures are not attributable to a single government branch’s lack of political 
will.  However, the proposals have failed because they have not overcome 
(or even addressed) the fact that prosecutors are not getting the training they 
need. 
1. Proposed Legislative Solutions: Civil Liability Against the Government 
State legislatures have sought to grant innocent people an avenue for 
redress for the damages caused by their wrongful convictions through either 
civil actions or cash payments.186  This can be an appropriate way to 
provide some compensation for the wrongfully convicted since, as outlined 
supra Part II.A, individual prosecutors are immune from civil liability.  
Responding to advocates, at least half of all U.S. states 187 and the District 
of Columbia188 have added a statutory scheme to provide some 
remuneration for those wrongfully incarcerated.  State schemes typically 
either pay a set amount for the time spent incarcerated,189 pay a restitution 
amount for lost wages,190 create a state board to set an individual’s 
 
186 See, e.g., N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(1) (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 2012). 
187 Compensation for the Wrongly Convicted, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/fix/Compensation.php (last visited Mar. 8, 2012) 
(advocating for $50,000 per year of wrongful incarceration to fulfill the moral and legal 
obligation to those exonerated).  The Innocence Project notes that while twenty-seven states 
and the District of Columbia have passed laws allowing some form of compensation for the 
wrongly accused, not all of these states provide financial compensation.  Id.  Instead, some 
only provide modest training programs.  See MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-1-214 (2011) 
(providing educational training for those exonerated by postconviction DNA testing). 
188 Those that were either unjustly convicted, pardoned for innocence, or incarcerated for 
longer than their maximum term can bring a claim against the city government.  D.C. CODE 
§ 2-421 to -423 (LexisNexis 2001). 
189 Amounts range across states from $50 per day to $50,000 per year.  For example, 
Missouri provides $50 per day in restitution but only to those found innocent by a 
postconviction DNA trial.  MO. ANN. STAT. § 650.058 (West 2006 & Supp. 2012). On the 
other end of the spectrum, Alabama provides $50,000 per year of incarceration, for someone 
convicted of a state felony or incarcerated pretrial for at least two years without individual 
fault for the conviction.  ALA. CODE § 29-2-156, -159 (LexisNexis 2003).  Most states are 
between these two amounts.  See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8 (2012) (providing 
$25,000 per year, up to a total of $250,000, for an incarcerated individual who can prove he 
is “factually innocent of the crime”). 
190  These payments can either be based on the individual’s past income or based on an 
average wage in the state.  For example, New Jersey provides an individualized assessment 
paying the greater of $20,000 or double the person’s annual income, plus reasonable 
attorney’s fees for those who “did not commit” the crime.  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4C-2, -5 
(West 2009).  On the other hand, Utah provides wrongfully convicted persons the monetary 
equivalent of the average annual nonagricultural payroll wage in the state for up to 15 years.  
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-405 (LexisNexis 2008).  
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particular compensation based on his time incarcerated,191 allow for a civil 
action,192 or, in the case of Texas, use a combination of schemes.193  States 
often condition such schemes on whether a person can prove her own 
innocence.194  The federal government, too, provides a claim for a 
maximum of $50,000 per year of wrongful imprisonment.195 
To the extent that these laws and tort actions are intended to go beyond 
repayment and disincentivize prosecutors from pursuing actions that lead to 
wrongful convictions by forcing a negative externality onto the 
government,196 they have failed.197  The payments do not come from local 
 
191 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 4900 (West 2011) (providing means for innocent or 
pardoned incarcerated individuals to make a claim to the California Victim Compensation 
and Government Claims Board for payment); WISC. STAT. ANN. § 775.05 (West 2009) 
(providing up to $25,000 in total equitable relief with a rate of compensation of $5,000 per 
year of imprisonment to individuals who successfully petition the Claims Board by 
demonstrating innocence). 
192  For instance, New York provides a wrongfully convicted person the right to bring a 
civil lawsuit within two years of a pardon or dismissal.  N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b(7) 
(McKinney 1989 & Supp. 2012).  The court is to provide the sum of money that the court 
determines is fair and reasonable to compensate someone who (1) was pardoned or whose 
conviction was reversed or vacated, and (2) can prove that she did not commit the actions 
charged and her conduct did not bring about those actions.  Id. § 8-b.  This scheme has been 
influential in other states.  See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-13a (LexisNexis 2009) (mirroring 
New York’s wrongful conviction statute, N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 8-b).  Most states with a civil 
cause of action provide a cap on damages.  See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8242 
(2003) (limiting damages to $300,000);   OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.48(E) (West 2006) 
(limiting damages to $40,330 for each year in prison pro rata).   
193 Texas provides either an administrative procedure, TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE 
ANN. § 103.051 (West 2011), or suit, id. § 103.001, but not both.  In either process, the 
statute requires a showing of innocence that led to a pardon or other judicial relief.  Id. 
§ 103.001(a). 
194 See supra notes 189–193 (reporting a number of states’ innocence requirements); see 
also e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102 (West 2009) (requiring a person demonstrate 
release from jail on the “grounds of innocence” in a claim to the Claims Commissioner); LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:572.8 (2012) (requiring petitioner to prove that he is “factually 
innocent of the crime” of which he was convicted); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 258D, §§ 1, 5 
(LexisNexis 2004 & Supp. 2012) (requiring an “erroneous felony conviction” demonstrated 
by (1) a governor’s pardon expressing belief in the individual’s innocence or (2) judicial 
relief granted to indicate that the person was not guilty); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 11-44-7 (West 
2012) (requiring actual innocence and that the wrongfully convicted individual did not 
perjure himself or fabricate evidence to bring about conviction).  But see IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 663A.1(1)(d) (West 1998) (conditioning restitutionary claims on whether a felony 
conviction was “vacated or dismissed, or . . . reversed”). 
195 28 U.S.C. § 2513(a)(1), (e) (2006) (increasing maximum to $100,000 per year when 
“unjustly sentenced to death”). 
196 Adam I. Kaplan, The Case for Comparative Fault in Compensating the Wrongfully 
Convicted, 56 UCLA L. REV. 227, 241 (2008). 
197 See generally Deborah Mostaghel, Wrongfully Incarcerated, Randomly 
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prosecutors’ offices.  Indeed, the state funds come from a state-wide fund 
and do not influence the local electorate selecting the district attorney.  
More likely, these laws provide small compensation for those whom the 
state agrees have been wronged—a worthy goal but not something that 
reduces abuses of discretion or the causes of the incarceration in the first 
place, as proper training might. 
Pre-Connick, lower courts entertained § 1983 suits against 
municipalities for failing to train prosecutors in an effort to create 
incentives by imposing civil liability on prosecutors’ offices.198  However, 
as discussed in the Introduction, last Term the Supreme Court made it 
unlikely that such a theory can be used successfully in the future.199  Civil 
liability is simply not a viable route to incentivize prosecutors to get proper 
training. 
2. Proposed Executive Solutions: Criminal Liability for Prosecutors 
Another proposal for realigning prosecutor incentives has been the 
criminal prosecution of prosecutors who intentionally withhold material 
evidence.200  However, there is no indication that this type of liability for 
prosecutors is a likely source of success, either.  After all, to seek criminal 
punishment against a prosecutor, another prosecutor, likely in the same 
office, will have to bring charges.  Intuitively, that seems unlikely, or at 
least a potential conflict of interest.  History has shown this premise to be 
true.  For instance, in the 1999 Chicago Tribune study previously 
mentioned, six prosecutors were charged during the twentieth century.201  
 
Compensated—How to Fund Wrongful-Conviction Compensation Statutes, 44 IND. L. REV. 
503, 505–09 (2011) (suggesting that it is easy to be convicted but much more difficult to be 
exonerated).  But see Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and Federal Wrongful 
Conviction Law, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 35, 101 (arguing that governments care about the trust of 
their communities and these laws help to grade that trust). 
198 See Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 300 (2d Cir. 1992); see also City of 
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 392–93 (1989) (vacating and remanding to allow the 
appellant to make a failure-to-train claim for police department misconduct); Myriam E. 
Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering “Custom” in Section 1983 Municipal 
Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17, 41 (2000) (applying failure-to-train theory more broadly). 
199 Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1356 (2011) (holding that a prosecutor’s 
office was not liable in a failure-to-train § 1983 suit when there was only a single Brady 
violation by a single staff member, despite evidence that this was a widespread problem). 
200 See, e.g., Genson & Martin, supra note 76, at 57; Krischke, supra note 47, at 434.  
These proposals would not necessarily require new laws; purposeful withholdings could 
meet state standards of fraud.  There is also at least one federal criminal statute that could 
apply.  See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2006) (prohibiting a person from depriving citizens of their 
constitutional rights under color of law). 
201 Possley & Armstrong, Prosecution on Trial, supra note 78, at 1. 
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Of those, two were acquitted, two had their charges dropped before trial, 
and only two were convicted—of misdemeanors with fines of $500 each.202 
Meanwhile, the DuPage County, Illinois case referenced supra Part 
II.B, where the prosecutors made up evidence in an effort to convict two 
innocent men of killing a ten-year-old girl, led to a jury acquittal of the 
prosecutor and police defendants.203  Showing how difficult it is to 
prosecute a prosecutor, some jurors were seen celebrating after the verdict 
was announced with the accused prosecutors and police officers at a local 
steakhouse.204 
The results in DuPage County are not surprising.  More than one 
prosecutor has expressed the feeling that, “[w]e don’t ask people to 
investigate their own family and prosecutors are like family.”205  So while 
prosecutors try to keep the “greater good . . . in mind . . . [, p]rosecutors just 
don’t prosecute prosecutors.”206  Further, these same prosecutors, found by 
judges to have violated defendants’ rights, were often later rewarded with 
promotions or judicial appointments despite their misconduct.207  All told, 
while many professions have successful self-regulation mechanisms, 
prosecutors have not implemented any proposals that could effectively 
check their own members.208 
3. Proposed Judicial Solutions: Bar Disciplinary Actions  
or Judicial Pressure 
State bar agencies’ disciplinary action has also been suggested as an 
 
202 Id. 
203 FRISBIE & GARRETT, supra note 77. 
204 Alden Long, Illinois Prosecutors and Police Acquitted Despite Evidence They 
Framed Defendant, WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE (June 16, 1999), http://www.wsws.org/
articles/1999/jun1999/dupa-j16.shtml. 
205 Possley & Armstrong, Prosecution on Trial, supra note 78. 
206 Id. 
207 See Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial & Error: Break Rules, Be Promoted, 
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 1999, at 1 [hereinafter Break Rules] (chronicling numerous Chicago-area 
prosecutors’ subsequent career advancements after acknowledged misconduct). 
208 See, e.g., Corn & Gershowitz, supra note 20, at 421 (advocating for a military 
command structure within prosecutors’ offices to deal with discretion in the chain of 
command); Bruce A. Green, Beyond Training Prosecutors About Their Disclosure 
Obligations: Can Prosecutors’ Offices Learn from their Lawyers’ Mistakes?, 31 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2161, 2710 (2010) (advocating for the medical industry’s checklisting approach to find 
errors); Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 177–80 
(2008) (promoting increased transparency and reporting).  Each of these proposals would 
require prosecutors to report on each other.  In the end, to reduce violations, prosecutors will 
have to desire that result. 
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effective tool to reduce prosecutorial misconduct.209  These proposals build 
on the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which require a 
lawyer to accept the disciplinary authority of the jurisdiction of his or her 
bar admission.210  The state bar office has the authority to discipline 
prosecutors who violate discovery rules or other ethical obligations.  The 
state bar could also pass additional requirements and rules regulating local 
prosecutors.  The bar office standards that apply to prosecutors are already 
written211 and are therefore theoretically enforceable. 
The evidence suggests that this is merely theoretical or potential, as 
ethics rules are not being enforced in any systematic way.  A 1980 to 1986 
study found that of forty-one state bar disciplinary agencies that responded, 
thirty-five states reported that no Brady-type complaints were filed during 
that period.212  In the ten years following this study, another commentator 
found only seven new cases seeking discipline for Brady violations.213  The 
results from these seven cases were as follows: one charge dismissed, two 
charges not proven, one private reprimand, one public reprimand, one 
suspension of three months, and one suspension of six months.214  A 1999 
Chicago Tribune study found similarly ineffective disciplinary treatment—
in 381 homicide cases where there was prosecutorial misconduct, there was 
not a single state bar action against a prosecutor.215  However, a recent 
review of disciplinary action for Brady-type prosecutorial misconduct 
suggests that state bar agencies may be taking these issues more seriously.  
For example, in one case, a prosecutor received a five-year probation and a 
four-year suspension from practice.216 
 
209 Kelly Gier, Prosecuting Injustice: Consequences of Misconduct, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 
191, 205 (2006); Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful 
Convictions: A Thought Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1, 11–
13 (2009). 
210 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5(a) (2011). 
211 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c)–(d) (2011) (“It is professional 
misconduct for a lawyer to: [(1)] engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 
misrepresentation; [or (2)] engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of 
justice.”). 
212 Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations: 
A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 730–31 (1987). 
213 Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the 
Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 833, 881–
82 (1997). 
214 Id. at 882. 
215 Armstrong & Possley, The Verdict, supra note 26. 
216 Brentford J. Ferreria, Ethical Considerations in Discovery, in DOING JUSTICE: A 
PROSECUTOR’S GUIDE TO ETHICS AND CIVIL LIABILITIES 87, 90–102 (Amie L. Clifford, ed., 
2d ed. 2007) (collecting cases where discipline imposed included suspensions of various 
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The few reported prosecutorial misconduct punishments might be 
surprising.  One may anticipate that even if prosecutors defend their own 
and defense attorneys do not pursue complaints because of a repeat-player 
concern, judges would have the independence and desire for fairness to 
censure prosecutors or at least to report violations.  Indeed, for this reason, 
the ABA standards guide judges to “inform the appropriate authority” if 
they know of violations of professional conduct or substantially question an 
attorney’s honesty or trustworthiness.217 
As with other proposals to reduce prosecutorial misconduct, judges 
have not played this role.  Judicial opinions often state the unacceptability 
of prosecutorial misconduct and its affront to justice, yet judges not only 
fail to refer the prosecutor’s behavior to the “appropriate authority,” they 
often do not name the prosecutor in their opinion.218  Further, in the state of 
California, where a statute requires judges to refer prosecutors for discipline 
when a misconduct violation reverses a conviction, not a single judge 
followed this rule and referred a prosecutor for discipline.219  Whether this 
failure has more to do with a shared background,220 their desire not to deter 
prosecutors,221 or their inability to enforce misconduct issues,222 it is clear 
 
lengths and public censures; suggesting that while punishment remains irregular, it is taking 
place); see also Duff Wilson, Judge Says He Will Suspend Durham Prosecutor Immediately, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2007, at A-15 (reporting on the disbarment of the district attorney who 
pursued false rape charges against the Duke lacrosse players). 
217 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.15 (2008).  Of course, one may question 
who the “appropriate authorities” are and whether such authorities would publically report 
either these referrals or subsequent disciplinary action.  Despite such concerns, it seems 
unlikely that such referrals are taking place regularly, as discussed in the text accompanying 
notes 218–222. 
218 Cf. In re Attorney C., 47 P.3d 1167, 1168 n.2, 1172 (Colo. 2002) (holding that a 
prosecutor has an ethical duty to disclose exculpatory evidence and that the prosecutor did 
not do so, but that the court would not punish the prosecutor and thus refrained from using 
the person’s name in the opinion). 
219 CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 71 (2008), available at 
http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/CCFAJFinalReport.pdf (finding no case of a judge 
reporting prosecutorial misconduct, despite fifty-four identified situations where California 
law required the judge to report and identify repeat offenders). 
220 Many judges are former prosecutors.  See, e.g., Armstrong & Possley, Break Rules, 
supra note 207, at 1 (finding forty-two former Cook County prosecutors as judges after cases 
reversed because of misconduct); Stephanie Woodrow, Senate Confirms Three Ex-
Prosecutors as Federal Judges, MAIN JUSTICE (Dec. 23, 2010, 1:23 PM), 
http://www.mainjustice.com/2010/12/23/senate-confirms-three-ex-prosecutors-as-federal-
judges/ (reporting on Senate confirmation for three ex-prosecutors and thirteen ex-
prosecutors that the Senate did not act to confirm). 
221 Sonja B. Starr, Sentence Reduction as a Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct, 97 
GEO. L.J. 1509, 1517 (2009). 
222 Cf. Ronald J. Allen & Ethan A. Hastert, From Winship to Apprendi to Booker: 
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that judges have not held prosecutors accountable.  Without accountability, 
there is no incentive for local offices to train new prosecutors on Brady 
doctrine concerns.  The mentors of these new prosecutors have never seen 
this as a problem because they have gone unpunished.  And so, the 
proposed judicial solution is yet one more regulatory mechanism that has 
failed to show prosecutors a straight path, which training could reveal. 
IV. INCENTIVES TO INCREASE TRAINING AND IMPROVE BRADY DOCTRINE 
COMPLIANCE 
Despite numerous proposals, as outlined in Part III.B, Brady violations 
continue.  The challenge for a would-be reformer is trying to make national 
proposals for local problems.  While one may desire a national policy like 
“open file” discovery223 or reducing the disclosure standard below 
materiality,224 neither is likely to become the constitutional doctrine of the 
United States.225  Similar desires to create civil liability or to implement the 
other national proposals outlined supra Part III.B are bound to fail because 
they do not deal with the local training problem. 
Instead, what is needed to begin addressing Brady violations is a series 
of modest changes that build on current state trends and realign local 
incentives to encourage more training.  When a state increases training, one 
trend may finally be overcome: Justice Ginsburg’s concern of inadequately 
trained prosecutors. 
A. CHANGE STATE WRONGFUL CONVICTION FUNDS TO HOLD 
COUNTIES RESPONSIBLE 
A growing number of states now have wrongful conviction funds.226  
In general, these funds provide a convicted felon who served jail time and 
can demonstrate innocence either a cause of action against the state or an 
 
Constitutional Command or Constitutional Blunder?, 58 STAN. L. REV. 195, 195–98 (2005) 
(arguing the courts have failed in their effort to regulate criminal charges available to 
prosecutors, which may suggest that courts would also be unable to regulate prosecutors’ 
behavior in criminal cases). 
223 Two states currently have “open-file” discovery—North Carolina and Ohio.  See N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 15A-903 (2011); OHIO R. OF CRIM. PROC. 16 (2010).  It is likely that some 
prosecutors’ offices in the country have also adopted this as a policy and procedure.  See 
Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 276 (1999) (noting that a Virginia county maintains an 
open-file policy for discovery).  Yet it seems unlikely that this number will grow to a 
majority of jurisdictions any time soon, even if one supports the policy. 
224 Welch & Taylor, supra note 95. 
225 See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995) (“We have never held that the 
Constitution demands an open file policy . . . .”). 
226 See supra notes 188–195 and accompanying text.   
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administrative payment from the state.227  In reviewing the statutes cited, all 
state and federal schemes internalize costs of wrongful convictions on the 
general taxpayer of the larger body.  For example, California’s law provides 
a payment from the state government based on the California Victim and 
Compensation Government Claims Board’s determination of a fair 
amount.228  This payment will be made from the government in Sacramento 
and not the county that hired or elected the prosecutor who acted 
improperly.  This holds true throughout the country.  None of the statutes 
hold accountable the local prosecutor’s office in the jurisdiction—such as a 
county—where the wrongful conviction occurred.  
By placing liability for the schemes on the state government, 
legislatures may help the wrongfully convicted person receive monetary 
compensation for the injustice in his life.  The legislatures have not, 
however, addressed the incentives of local prosecutors seeking convictions.  
In fact, they may further misalign incentives because the state may step in 
to defend the conviction on appeal—or, if the state’s compensation scheme 
requires a wrongfully convicted person to initiate a civil lawsuit, it may step 
in to defend that suit—to avoid a payout from the state-based fund, 
reducing the county’s civil litigation costs.  This does not rationally align 
incentives.  A more effective incentive would require the county both to pay 
the costs of monetary compensation and to pay the legal bills for defending 
these actions.  In addition, consideration could be given to salary reductions 
or modest financial penalties for the individual attorney to get her “skin” in 
the game.  While such a plan may increase the incentive to avoid 
inappropriate prosecutions, lawmakers would also need to consider whether 
it might lead to a reduction in legitimate prosecutions of difficult cases or 
deter new professional prosecutors. 
Such cost shifting—whether to counties or to individual prosecutors—
would not necessarily need to break the bank.  While it is arguable that the 
larger the percentage of funds put on local officials, the larger the 
behavioral change would be, even small amounts can have an outsized 
impact.229  State governments could continue to supply most of the funding 
 
227 See supra notes 188–195. 
228 CAL. PENAL CODE § 4900 (West 2011). 
229 Cf. Robert D. Pritchard & Michael I. Curtis, The Influence of Goal Setting and 
Financial Incentives on Task Performance, 10 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. 
PERFORMANCE 175, 182 (1973) (pointing out that incentives need to reach at least a minimal 
level before they have an impact—$3 worked better than 2¢); Stephanie Stern, Encouraging 
Conservation on Private Lands: A Behavioral Analysis of Financial Incentives, 48 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 541, 562–63 (2006) (suggesting that the most important factor for conservation 
incentives was not the amount of the incentive, but that the incentive is in place across a time 
period). 
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and require, for instance, that counties contribute a modest 25% of wrongful 
conviction liability.  Creative state legislatures could build a graduated 
system where county offices would be liable for a small monetary amount 
at first, which would serve as a warning and encourage behavioral change, 
but be liable for larger amounts of funds if misconduct continued over time.  
Or the legislatures could consider safe harbors for meeting certain training 
paradigms.  Either modification would allow the county to engage in 
retraining programs ensuring prosecutors know their respective 
requirements.  It could also allow the state scheme to give credit for such 
retraining in the amount it charges the county. 
Either way, the state would likely remain a backstop if a county were 
unable to compensate the wrongfully accused.  Together, the plan would 
align the state, the county, the prosecutor (facing reduced salary), and the 
defendant and result in fewer improper prosecutions. 
B. REQUIRED TRAINING PROGRAMS ON BRADY EVIDENCE 
While most prosecutors’ offices in this country are organized at the 
county level and receive a significant portion of their funding from county 
government, state funding to prosecutors’ offices is increasing.230  With 
additional money being spent on the offices, state governments should be 
able to have more influence on their county prosecutors’ offices’ 
operations.  With that additional power, states should insist on mandatory 
training programs as suggested by both the ABA and the NDAA.231  
Ideally, this would be for all staff members in each office.  But at a 
minimum, states should insist on mandatory training for elected or 
appointed head district attorneys before providing state funding to the 
offices.  This would be a powerful check on such offices and ensure that the 
proper training for prosecutors is taking place. 
One might suspect this proposal of having the same multi-actor 
problem that prevents “open file” or civil liability proposals from working.  
The major difference is that “open file” would likely require the action of 
forty-eight legislatures.  This proposal would only require the state 
agencies charged with distribution of funds to the county prosecutors to put 
some standards on the money going out their doors.  This allows a different 
political actor, with different incentives, to influence local behavior.  In that 
 
230 In 2005, less than a third of county prosecutors’ offices received only county funds.  
PERRY, supra note 25, at 4.  This is a large decline since 1994, when nearly half of all county 
prosecutors’ offices received only county funds.  CAROL J. DEFRANCES ET AL., BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 1994, at 2 
(1996). 
231 See supra notes 180–185 and accompanying text. 
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way, this incentive could be used quickly to add financial pressures on local 
offices to learn what prosecutors should already know under Brady. 
This training could be in conjunction with a state bar’s continuing 
legal education requirements.  While a few states do not require continuing 
legal education,232 most do.233  States should require prosecutors to 
complete either additional hours of training in criminal-procedure-specific 
topics or require all of their hours to be on such topics.  This would not 
require significant time or financial costs; continuing legal education is 
available for prosecutors online.234  The state just needs to make a point of 
requiring training so that all prosecutors receive it. 
C. NATIONAL GUIDELINES AND PROCEDURES FOR 
PROSECUTORIAL OFFICES 
As explained in Part III.A of this Comment, national legal 
organizations recommend that local prosecutorial offices develop their own 
guidelines and policies to deal with the issue of discretion.235  But many 
offices are small, serving a population below 250,000 people, and have a 
median staff size of ten, including nonattorney support staff.236  While well-
intentioned, it may be an inefficient use of resources for each of these 
offices to develop the policies and procedures that go into a document like 
the United States Attorneys’ Manual.237  With small staffs lacking the same 
cadre of experts as the Department of Justice, duplicating these efforts is 
difficult.   
Instead, a national standard handbook could provide a base document 
that prosecutors’ offices could modify to suit their local operations.  Such a 
document would discuss best practices for Brady decisions, including how 
the doctrine works, what a prosecutor’s obligations are, and guidelines for 
other discretionary decisions.  The NDAA is likely the best organization to 
 
232 See, e.g., Randy Foreman, Continuing Legal Education in Michigan, MICH. B. J., Jan. 
2008, at 44 (noting that Michigan is one of eight states that does not require continuing legal 
education); Advancing Your Career, MASS. B. ASS’N, http://www.massbar.org/cle (last 
visited Dec. 5, 2012) (noting that “Massachusetts is one of the few non-mandatory 
[continuing legal education] states”). 
233 See MCLE Information by Jurisdiction, A.B.A., 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications_cle/mandatory_cle/mcle_states.html (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2012) (providing information about required continuing legal education in each 
state); see also supra note 232 (noting how non-mandatory states recognize their rarity). 
234 Thomas J. Charron, NDAA Begins Distance Learning, PROSECUTOR, May/June 2005, 
at 6. 
235 See supra notes 179–185 and accompanying text. 
236 PERRY, supra note 25, at 3. 
237 UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 184.  
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take on such a project.  The organization had thirteen training conferences 
scheduled over the last six months of 2012238 and numerous educational 
publications.239  The organization would also have their National 
Prosecution Standards to begin the project.  But such a document would 
need to go beyond being merely an “aspirational guide to professional 
conduct in the performance of the prosecutorial function.”240  It would need 
to include hypothetical situations, potential considerations of a prosecutor 
who faces challenges in understanding the doctrine, and guidance to fulfill 
Brady obligations.  It would be the standard handbook of how to actually do 
the job of being a prosecutor, not just suggestions for how to be a 
professional.  This guide would have the added benefit of being usable by a 
single prosecutor even if her office was not providing necessary training, 
thus ensuring all national prosecutors knew the basic requirements of the 
job. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As a postscript to the Connick v. Thompson case, earlier this year and 
for the second time in seventeen years,241 the Supreme Court reversed a 
conviction involving the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office for 
failing to follow the Brady doctrine requirements in a criminal 
prosecution.242  In the latest case, Smith v. Cain, the petitioner asked the 
Supreme Court to reverse a first-degree murder conviction based solely on 
the testimony of a single eyewitness.243  Unknown to the petitioner’s trial 
defense team, the prosecution knew that the sole eyewitness had previously 
stated on more than one occasion that he could not identify his attackers.244  
Furthering this injustice, a newspaper photo of the petitioner as a witness 
may have tainted the eyewitness’s identification.245 
Despite such a clear violation of Brady, prompting Justice Scalia to 
suggest during oral argument that the respondent’s attorney could have 
 
238 All Upcoming Courses, NAT’L DISTRICT ATT’YS ASS’N, http://www.ndaa.org/
upcoming_courses.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2012). 
239 Publications, NAT’L DISTRICT ATT’YS ASS’N, http://www.ndaa.org/publications.html 
(last visited Dec. 5, 2012). 
240 NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 153, at 1. 
241 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995). 
242 Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 631 (2012). 
243 Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, 10–11, Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627 (2011) (No. 
10-8145), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/
10-8145.pdf (discussing the lack of any other evidence linking the petitioner to the crime). 
244 Id. at 3, 6, 46 (explaining that detective’s notes say the eyewitness “could not ID; 
would not know them if I saw them; can’t tell if had faces covered; didn’t see anyone”). 
245 Id. at 5. 
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“stop[ped] fighting” about the necessity to turn over the information,246 the 
respondent’s attorney continued to argue that this eyewitness’s 
contradictory statements made no difference.247  In a relatively short 
opinion, the Supreme Court reversed because the prosecution’s only 
evidence was cast into doubt by undisclosed material information.248 
While the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office clearly is an 
extreme example of prosecutorial misconduct,249 Smith v. Cain represents 
one of countless Brady violations that occur each year.250  Unfortunately, 
this misconduct happens more often than one would like and the 
misconduct is not contained to a single jurisdiction.251  Prosecutorial 
misconduct threatens the due process rights of defendants.  Legal scholars 
have spent much time trying to develop ways to police prosecutors or 
reduce their discretion.  Yet these proposals have either not been adopted or 
have not had an impact.252 
As this Comment discusses, the problem remains that prosecutorial 
training is simply not adequate to prepare lawyers to apply doctrines as 
complex as Brady.  In Connick v. Thompson, Justice Thomas, writing for 
the majority of the Court, indicated his belief that as legal professionals, 
prosecutors have the training and ethical obligation to learn on their own.253  
While this may be theoretically true, Justice Ginsburg is correct in dissent 
that law school and current legal structures are not enough.  Additional 
training is necessary.  Whether this training comes in response to financial 
pressure, threat of job loss or financial penalties, or the dissemination of 
national standards, more is needed.  Only then can the nation ensure that 
“justice shall be done.”254 
 
246 Id. at 51; see also id. at 49–50 (Justice Kagan asking respondent whether her “office 
ever consider[ed] just confessing error in this case? . . . We took cert a while ago.  I’m just 
wondering whether you’ve ever considered confessing error.”). 
247 Id. at 29, 33, 38, 43–46. 
248 Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627, 631 (2012).  By contrast, Justice Thomas, the lone 
dissenter, spent much longer reviewing the factual record, id. at 633–39, and suggested that 
the information withheld from Smith was not enough to “establish[] a reasonable probability 
that the cumulative effect of this evidence would have caused the jury to change its verdict.”  
Id. at 633. 
249 Brief for Orleans Public Defenders Office as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 
5–10, Smith v. Cain, 132 S. Ct. 627 (2012) (No. 10-8145), 2011 WL 3706111 (detailing the 
long history of Brady abuses committed over the last twenty years by the Orleans Parish 
District Attorney’s Office). 
250 See supra Part II.B. 
251 Supra Part II.B. 
252 See supra Part III.B. 
253 See Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 1361–63 (2011). 
254 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
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APPENDIX 
The following is a list of all 202 ABA-accredited law schools255 with 
information about whether they require criminal law and criminal 
procedure. 
 
255 The ABA has accredited 202 schools; the three schools that have been approved 
provisionally—UC-Irvine, La Verne, and UMass-Dartmouth—are denoted with an asterisk.  
See ABA-Approved Law Schools by Year, A. B. A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
legal_education/resources/aba_approved_law_schools/by_year_approved.html (last visited 
Nov. 26, 2012).  However, the ABA’s accreditation of the Justice Advocate General’s Legal 
Center and School is not for general law students, but for those pursuing a master of laws 
degree in military law.  See Judge Advocate General Graduate Course, JUDGE ADVOC. GEN. 
LEGAL CENTER & SCH., https://www.jagcnet.army.mil/8525736A005BC8F9/0/CE89C608
13E53611852573550051C3D8?opendocument (last visited Nov. 26, 2012).  Due to this 










Albany Law School Y N http://www.albanylaw.edu/media/user/registrar/Class_of_20
12_Requirements.pdf 
American University, 
Washington College of 
Law 
Y Y http://www.wcl.american.edu/registrar/required.cfm 




Arizona State University, 
Sandra Day O’Connor 













Ave Maria School of Law Y Y http://www.avemarialaw.edu/academics/RequiredCurriculu
m 
Barry University, Dwayne 
O. Andreas School of Law 
Y Y http://www.barry.edu/law/future-students/academic-
program/full-time-day-program.html 
Baylor University, Sheila 
& Walter Umphrey Law 
Center 
Y Y http://www.baylor.edu/law/ps/index.php?id=75581 




Boston University School 
of Law 
Y N http://www.bu.edu/law/prospective/jd/first/curriculum.html, 
http://www.bu.edu/law/prospective/jd/courses/ 
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Brigham Young 




















Norman Adrian Wiggins 
School of Law 
Y Y http://law.campbell.edu/page.cfm?id=392&n=curriculum 
Capital University Law 
School 
Y N http://law.capital.edu/JD_Curriculum/ 
Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law 








Charleston School of Law Y Y http://www.charlestonlaw.edu/Academic-
Affairs/Graduation-Requirements.aspx 




Chicago-Kent College of 
Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology 
Y N http://www.kentlaw.edu/depts/acadadm/handbook.html#1.2, 
http://www.kentlaw.edu/depts/acadadm/handbook.html#11.2 
City University of New 
York School of Law 
Y N http://www.law.cuny.edu/academics/courses.html, 
http://www.law.cuny.edu/academics/courses/first-year.html 
Cleveland State University, 
Cleveland-Marshall 












Columbia University Law 
School 
Y N https://www.law.columbia.edu/jd_applicants/curriculum/1l, 
http://www.law.columbia.edu/courses/browse?global.c_id=3
011 
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Creighton University 





DePaul University School 
of Law 
Y N http://www.law.depaul.edu/programs/general%5Fjd/, 
http://www.law.depaul.edu/programs/course_descriptions.as
p 
Detroit College of Law 
(now Michigan State 
University College of Law) 
Y N http://www.law.msu.edu/academics/ac-juris-sched.html, 
http://www.law.msu.edu/academics/courses.php?let1=C&let
2=D 
Dickinson School of Law 
(now Pennsylvania State 
University, The Dickinson 
School of Law) 
Y Y http://law.psu.edu/academics/jd/first_year 





Drexel University Earle 




Duke University School of 
Law 




School of Law 
Y Y http://www.duq.edu/academics/schools/law/academic-
programs/curriculum-outline 
Elon University School of 
Law 
Y Y http://www.elon.edu/e-web/law/academics/curriculum.xhtml 





Thomas Goode Jones 
School of Law 
Y Y http://www.faulkner.edu/JSL/academics/documents/revisedc
urriculum.pdf 
Florida A&M University 
















Florida State University 





Fordham University School 
of Law 
Y N http://law.fordham.edu/registrar/18255.htm 
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256 Georgetown features two tracks for first-year students—one requiring a traditional 
criminal law course and the other requiring a criminal justice seminar.  See First-Year 
Information, GEORGETOWN L., http://www.law.georgetown.edu/academics/academic-
programs/jd-program/full-time-program/first-year.cfm (last visited Nov. 26, 2012). 
George Mason University 









Georgia State University 
College of Law 
Y N http://law.gsu.edu/students/4755.html#fulltime 
Golden Gate University 
School of Law 
Y Y http://law.ggu.edu/media/law/documents/jd-prospectus-
2013.pdf 
Gonzaga University School 
of Law 
Y N http://www.law.gonzaga.edu/academics/curriculum/required/ 
Hamline University School 
of Law 
Y N http://law.hamline.edu/jd/course_descriptions.html, 
http://law.hamline.edu/course_descriptions.html 








Howard University School 
of Law 
Y N http://www.law.howard.edu/law_school_curriculum 





Indiana University School 
of Law-Indianapolis 
Y N http://indylaw.indiana.edu/courses/required.cfm, 
http://indylaw.indiana.edu/courses/elective.cfm 
Inter American University 




Lewis and Clark College 
Law School 
N Y https://www.lclark.edu/live/files/8443 
Liberty University School 
of Law 
Y Y http://law.liberty.edu/index.cfm?PID=8966 
Louisiana State University, 





Loyola Law School-Los 
Angeles 
Y N http://intranet.lls.edu/tracks/required.html 
Loyola University-New 






School of Law 
Y N http://luc.edu/law/registrar/degree_requirements/guidelines.h
tml,http://www.luc.edu/law/courses/criminal.html 
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McGeorge School of Law, 







Mercer University, Walter 
F. George School of Law 
Y N http://law.mercer.edu/academics/registrar/required15, 
http://www2.law.mercer.edu/courses/index.cfm?blockid=7 
Mississippi College School 
of Law 
Y N http://law.mc.edu/academics/first-year-curriculum/, 
http://law.mc.edu/academics/courses/#Criminal 
New England Law/Boston Y Y http://www.nesl.edu/students/required_courses.cfm 




New York University 









North Carolina Central 











University College of Law 
Y N http://law.niu.edu/law/academic/first_year/index.shtml, 
http://law.niu.edu/law/academic/courses1.shtml 
Northern Kentucky 
University, Salmon P. 
Chase College of Law 
Y Y http://chaselaw.nku.edu/academics/full_time_day.php, 
http://chaselaw.nku.edu/academics/course_offerings.php 
Northwestern University 
School of Law 
Y N http://www.law.northwestern.edu/academics/jd/#gradreqs 
Nova Southeastern 
University, Shepard Broad 
Law Center 
Y N http://nsulaw.nova.edu/students/course-descriptions.cfm 
Ohio Northern University 




Oklahoma City University 




Pace University School of 
Law 
Y N http://www.law.pace.edu/juris-doctor-program, 
http://www.law.pace.edu/course-descriptions-0 
Pepperdine University 
School of Law 
Y Y http://law.pepperdine.edu/academics/content/catalog2012.pd
f, page 156 
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Phoenix School of Law Y Y http://www.phoenixlaw.edu/downloads/Student%20Handbo
ok.pdf 
Pontifical Catholic 
University of Puerto Rico 





School of Law 
Y N http://www.quinnipiac.edu/prebuilt/pdf/law_catalog2012-
2013.pdf 






Roger Williams University 
School of Law 
Y Y http://law.rwu.edu/academics/curriculum 











Saint Louis University 
School of Law 
Y N http://www.slu.edu/x48935.xml, 
http://www.slu.edu/x48939.xml 
Samford University, 




Santa Clara University 











Seton Hall University 






South Texas College of 
Law 




University School of Law 
Y N http://www.law.siu.edu/Current%20Students/PDF/crsrqt.pdf 
Southern Methodist 












Southwestern Law School Y Y http://www.swlaw.edu/academics/jd/dayprogram 
2012] PROSECUTORIAL TRAINING WHEELS 1317 
St. John's University 






St. Mary's University 





St. Thomas University 
School of Law (Florida) 
Y N http://www.stu.edu/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=NrKTJKIUVp
o%3d&tabid=850 












Suffolk University Law 
Center 









Temple University, James 





Texas Southern University, 
Thurgood Marshall School 
of Law 
Y Y http://www.tsulaw.edu/academics/curriculum.html 
Texas Tech University 
School of Law 
Y Y http://www.depts.ttu.edu/officialpublications/LawSchool/ind
ex.html 
Texas Wesleyan University 
School of Law 
Y Y http://law.txwes.edu/CurrentStudents/CourseDescriptions/Co
urseDescriptions201112/tabid/1578/Default.aspx#lockstep 
The Catholic University of 




The George Washington 









The Ohio State University, 




The University of Akron 
School of Law 
Y N http://www.uakron.edu/dotAsset/1837471.pdf, 
http://www.uakron.edu/law/curriculum/courseAE.dot. 
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The University of Alabama 
School of Law 
Y N http://www.law.ua.edu/academics/ 
The University of Arizona, 




The University of Arkansas 
School of Law-Fayetteville 
Y N http://catalogofstudies.uark.edu/4362.php 
The University of Montana 
School of Law 
Y N http://www.umt.edu/law/students/firstyear.php 
The University of New 





The University of 
Tennessee College of Law 
Y N http://law.utk.edu/academic-programs/jd-requirements/ 
The University of Texas 
School of Law 
Y N https://www.utexas.edu/law/academics/degrees/jd.html 
The University of Tulsa 








Thomas M. Cooley Law 
School 
Y Y http://www.cooley.edu/prospective/required.html 
Touro College, Jacob D. 
Fuchsberg Law Center 
Y N http://www.tourolaw.edu/Academics/?pageid=65 















University of Arkansas at 
Little Rock, William H. 





University of Baltimore 
School of Law 





Berkeley, College of Law 
Y N http://www.law.berkeley.edu/162.htm, 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/8063.htm 
University of California-





Hastings, School of Law 
Y N http://www.uchastings.edu/academics/catalog/docs/CAT11-
12.pdf 
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University of California-
Irvine School of Law* 
Y N http://www.law.uci.edu/registrar/curriculum.html, 
http://apps.law.uci.edu/CourseCatalog/Search.aspx 
University of California-




University of Chicago Law 
School 
Y N http://www.law.uchicago.edu/courses 
University of Cincinnati 







University of Colorado 
Law School 
Y N http://www.colorado.edu/law/academics/requirements.htm 
University of Connecticut 




University of Dayton 





University of Denver 







University of Detroit 
Mercy School of Law 
Y N http://www.law.udmercy.edu/index.php/academics1/required
-and-bar-related-courses 
University of Florida, 




University of Georgia 
School of Law 
Y N http://www.law.uga.edu/required-courses 
University of Hawai’i, 
William S. Richardson 
School of Law 
Y N http://www.law.hawaii.edu/jd/degree-requirements 
University of Houston Law 
Center 
Y N http://www.law.uh.edu/academic/jd.html, 
http://www.uh.edu/grad_catalog/law/law_courses.html 
University of Idaho 






University of Illinois 
College of Law 
Y N http://www.law.illinois.edu/academics/curriculum 
University of Iowa College 
of Law 
Y N http://www.law.uiowa.edu/academics/, 
http://www.law.uiowa.edu/documents/courses.pdf 
University of Kansas 
School of Law 
Y N http://www.law.ku.edu/courses,  
http://www.law.ku.edu/requiredcourses 
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University of Kentucky 
College of Law 
Y N http://www.law.uky.edu/index.php?pid=171 
University of La Verne 
College of Law* 
Y Y http://law.laverne.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/Catalog-
2011-12-Final.pdf 
University of Louisville, 
Louis D. Brandeis School 
of Law 
Y N http://www.law.louisville.edu/academics/1L, 
http://www.law.louisville.edu/academics/graduation-
requirements 




University of Maryland 
School of Law 




Massachusetts School of 
Law-Dartmouth* 
Y Y http://www.umassd.edu/law/academics/curriculum/ 
University of Memphis 
School of Law 
Y Y http://www.memphis.edu/law/currentstudents/coursestudy.p
hp 
University of Miami 
School of Law 
N Y http://www.law.miami.edu/currentstudents/degree_requirem
ents/jd_first_year_requirements.php?op=1 
University of Michigan 
Law School 
Y N http://web.law.umich.edu/_ClassSchedule/CourseList.asp 
University of Minnesota 
Law School 
Y N http://www.law.umn.edu/prospective/courseguide.html#s11, 
http://www.law.umn.edu/prospective/curriculum2.html 
University of Mississippi 








Kansas City School of Law 
Y Y http://law.umkc.edu/academics/j-d-requirements.asp 
University of Nebraska 
College of Law 
Y N http://law.unl.edu/curriculum#upper, 
http://law.unl.edu/curriculum#first 
University of Nevada-Las 
Vegas, William S. Boyd 




University of New 
Hampshire School of Law 
N Y http://law.unh.edu/academics/jd-degree 
University of North 
Carolina at Chapel Hill 
School of Law 
Y N http://www.law.unc.edu/academics/courses/default.aspx; 
http://www.law.unc.edu/academics/courses/firstyear/ 
University of North Dakota 
School of Law 
Y N http://law.und.edu/academics/courses.cfm,  
http://law.und.edu/students/policy-manual/general-
requirements.cfm 
University of Notre Dame 
Law School 
Y N http://law.nd.edu/academics/degrees/j-d/first-year/, 
http://law.nd.edu/academics/degrees/j-d/second-and-third-
years/ 
University of Oklahoma 





University of Oregon 
School of Law 
Y N http://law.uoregon.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/2012-
13-Law-Course-Catalog.pdf 
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University of Pennsylvania 
Law School 
Y N https://www.law.upenn.edu/academics/degrees.php, 
https://www.law.upenn.edu/academics/jd-requirements.php 
University of Pittsburgh 
School of Law 
Y N http://www.law.pitt.edu/academics/courses/catalog, 
http://www.law.pitt.edu/academics/courses/catalog/1L, 
http://www.law.pitt.edu/academics/juris-doctor 
University of Puerto Rico 




University of Richmond, 






University of San Diego 





University of San 
Francisco School of Law 
Y N http://www.usfca.edu/law/jd/curriculum/fulltime/ 
University of South 
Carolina School of Law 
Y N http://law.sc.edu/academics/jd_description.shtml 
University of South Dakota 
School of Law 
Y Y http://www.usd.edu/law/academics.cfm, 
http://www.usd.edu/law/upload/CurriculumGuidebook.pdf 
University of Southern 






University of St. Thomas 





University of the District of 
Columbia, David A. Clarke 
School of Law 
Y Y http://www.law.udc.edu/?page=FullTimeCurriculum 
University of Toledo 
College of Law 
Y N http://law.utoledo.edu/students/pdf/CourseDescriptions.pdf 
University of Utah, S.J. 
Quinney College of Law 
Y N http://www.law.utah.edu/current/course-list/, 
http://www.law.utah.edu/student-handbook/graduation-
requirements/#required 
University of Virginia 
School of Law 
Y N http://www.law.virginia.edu/html/academics/curriculum.htm 
University of Washington 





University of Wisconsin 
Law School 
Y Y http://www.law.wisc.edu/prospective/firstyear.htm 
University of Wyoming 





School of Law 
Y N http://www.valpo.edu/law/current-students/law-registrar/c-
resources/c-courses-2 
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School of Law 
Y N http://www.law.villanova.edu/Academics/Degree%20Progra
ms/JD/First%20Year.aspx 
Wake Forest University 
School of Law 
Y N http://academics.law.wfu.edu/courses/, 
http://academics.law.wfu.edu/degree/jd/ 
Washburn University 
School of Law 
Y Y http://washburnlaw.edu/curriculum/ 
Washington and Lee 
University School of Law 
Y N   http://law.wlu.edu/academics/page.asp?pageid=1100, 
http://law.wlu.edu/academics/page.asp?pageid=1102 
Washington University 
School of Law 
Y N http://law.wustl.edu/registrar/pages.aspx?id=8542; 
http://law.wustl.edu/academics/pages.aspx?id=178#1L 
Wayne State University 
Law School 
Y N http://law.wayne.edu/courses/required-first-year.php, 
http://law.wayne.edu/courses/elective-upper-level.php 
West Virginia University 
College of Law 
Y N http://law.wvu.edu/academics/courses_and_descriptions, 
http://law.wvu.edu/academics/curriculum 
Western New England 
College School of Law 
Y N http://assets.wne.edu/21/program_of_study_revised.pdf, 
http://www1.law.wne.edu/current/index.cfm?selection=doc.
8301&courselisting=alpha&term=Spring 
Western State University 
College of Law 
Y Y http://content.wsulaw.edu/assets/Academics/Syllabi-
Booklists/2011/program-of-study.pdf 
Whittier Law School Y Y http://www.law.whittier.edu/index/build/degrees-
requirements/full-time-day-division/ 
Widener University School 
of Law- Harrisburg 
Y Y http://law.widener.edu/Gateway/CurrentStudents/Harrisburg
Students/AcademicResources/Curriculum.aspx 






College of Law 
Y N http://www.willamette.edu/wucl/programs/jd/curriculum.htm
l 
William Mitchell College 
of Law 
N N http://web.wmitchell.edu/students/curriculum/, 
http://web.wmitchell.edu/students/curriculum-courses/#C 




Benjamin N. Cardozo 
School of Law 
Y N http://www.cardozo.yu.edu/MemberContentDisplay.aspx?cc
md=ContentDisplay&ucmd=UserDisplay&userid=10354&c
ontentid=3848, 
www.cardozo.yu.edu/uploadedFiles/Cardozo/Profiles/registr
ar-124/Guide_to_Course_Selection2007-2008.pdf 
